Aliens and Equal Protection:  Why Not the Right To Vote? by Rosberg, Gerald M.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 75 
Issue 5 Issues 5&6 
1977 
Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right To Vote? 
Gerald M. Rosberg 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Education Law Commons, and the Immigration 
Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Gerald M. Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right To Vote?, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1092 (1977). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol75/iss5/13 
 
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
ALIENS AND EQUAL PROTECTION: 
WHY NOT THE RIGHT TO VOTE? 
Gerald M. Rosberg* 
Alienage, the Supreme Court has recently insisted, is a suspect 
classification. 1 Thus, statutes disadvantaging aliens as a class are 
subject to strict judicial scrutiny and are held invalid unless justified 
by some compelling state interest. The extension of this special 
judicial solicitude to aliens is remarkable enough in view of the thin-
ness of the precedential support and the imperfections of the analogy 
between alienage and race, the paradigm suspect classification. But 
it is all the more puzzling in that it has come at a time when the 
Supreme Court, in no expansionist mood, has resisted the demand 
of virtually every other group for this same judicial protection. 
Still, if one concedes the premise that alienage is a suspect classi-
fication, one can fairly easily explain why a state may not deny aliens 
welfare benefits2 or civil service employment3 or access to the bar.4 
But how can one explain why a state is permitted to deny aliens the 
opportunity to vote, which every state in fact does?5 Is it simply that 
the case has not yet arisen and restrictions on aliens' voting will 
sooner or later fall? I doubt that, since the Supreme Court has just 
brushed aside, a case that raised the issue squarely, declaring that 
the case did not even present a substantial federal question. 0 Alter-
natively, is the states' need to deny aliens the vote so obviously com-
pelling that articulation of the reasons for that conclusion could serve 
no useful purpose? I doubt that too, since the effect of raising the 
issue is more often to provoke a reexamination of the premise that 
alienage is a garden-variety suspect classification than it is to produce 
a reasoned discussion of the supposed need to deny aliens the vote. 
* Associate Professor of Law, The University of Michigan. B.A. 1968, Harvard 
College; J.D. 1971, Harvard University.-E<I. 
1. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). 
2. 403 U.S. 365. 
3. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973). 
4. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973). See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 97 S. Ct. 
2120 (1977) (financial assistance for higher education); Examining Bd. v. Flores 
de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976) (license to practice as civil engineer). 
5. A. REITMAN & R. DAVIDSON, nm ELECTION PROCESS: VOTING LAWS AND PRO· 
CEDURES 8-9 (1972). 
6. Skafte v. Rorex, - Colo. -, 553 P.2d 830 (1976); appeal dismissed, 91 S. 
Ct. 1638 (1977). 
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A constitutional right of at least some aliens to vote does not 
seem to me at all unthinkable.7 Throughout much of the nineteenth 
century and part of the twentieth, aliens enjoyed the right to vote 
in a great many states. 8 The states that extended the franchise to 
aliens plainly did not believe that they were acting under constitu-
tional compulsion. But given our present understanding of the 
mission of the equal protection clause, much can now be said in de-
fense of such a constitutional right. My purpose here is to outline 
the case that might be made for the right of aliens to vote. I should 
make clear at the outset, however, that this is an area where one 
must proceed with caution, for the Supreme Court, despite its now 
numerous incursions into the thicket of politics and voting, has barely 
begun to construct a framework for analyzing questions concerning 
the nature of political representation and the definition of a political 
community.9 Indeed, the inscrutability of these questions and the 
sense of unease produced by discussion of them may account for the 
general reluctance to face squarely the issues raised by alien 
suffrage. 
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
As background it may be useful to begin with a brief survey of 
the historical practice concerning aliens' voting. My purpose is not 
just to demonstrate that allowing aliens to vote was thought accept-
able throughout a substantial part of American history, including 
periods characterized by much more xenophobia than we are familiar 
with today. More important, the historical experience rebuts the 
argument that the terms "citizen" and "voter" are synonymous and 
that one cannot, therefore, speak coherently of a right of aliens to 
vote. In this country aliens have often enjoyed the right of suffrage. 
And, by the same token, a great many citizens have not. 
Surprisingly little has been written on the history of suffrage in 
the United States, and the few apparently reliable sources are so pre-
occupied with the demise of property, sex, and race qualifications 
7. The Commission of the Common Market has under study a proposal to extend 
voting rights in each of the member countries to residents who are nationals of one 
of the other member countries. See Commission of the European Communities, Re-
port on the Implementation of Point 11 of the Final Communique Issued at the 
European Summit Held in Paris on 9 and 10 December 1974, in BULL. OF THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 26 (Supp. 7, 1975). See also COMMISSION FOR THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, PROGRAM FOR 1977, at 41 (1977). 
8. See text at notes 31-36 infra. 
9. Casper, Apportionment and the Right To Vote: Standards of Judicial Scrutiny, 
1973 SuP. CT. REv. 1, 2. 
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that it is hard to obtain a clear picture of how aliens were treated. 
Most obscure, predictably, is the experience in the colonial period. 
Generalizations are difficult not only because of the problem of de-
termining how the formal rules of suffrage were translated into prac-
tice, 10 but also because the concept of citizenship did not have the 
same meaning as it has today. Until the Constitution centralized the 
power to naturalize aliens in the national government, no single 
definition of citizenship was applicable throughout the American 
states.11 The question that must be asked, therefore, is what, if any, 
voting rights were extended to persons that we would now consider 
aliens-that is, persons neither born nor naturalized in the United 
States nor born to American parents overseas. 
The key to the early suffrage qualifications was property. In the 
early colonial period, one commentator has pointed out, "the under-
lying idea was that a man's property entitled him to vote-not his 
character, his nationality, beliefs, or residence, but his property."12 
Even after other qualifications were added, the property requirement 
remained central. Chilton Williamson maintains that the number of 
potential voters excluded under the property tests may well have 
been much smaller than is generally supposed, and it was almost cer-
tainly smaller than the number so excluded in England during the 
comparable period.13 But the property qualifications still cut deeply 
and a significant percentage of the male citizenry was not permitted 
to vote. Women were completely excluded even though their ca-
pacity to hold citizenship was not questioned. No one had to argue 
that a man without property or a woman or an infant was not a citizen 
and therefore not entitled to vote, since no one supposed that a 
citizen was by definition a voter.14 
At the same time that many persons we would now consider 
citizens were barred from voting, evidently at least some that we 
would now call aliens were allowed to vote. In the first place, re-
quirements for naturalization of non-English subjects, at least if they 
were Protestants, were apparently so relaxed at times in some of the 
10. See C. WILLIAMSON, AMERICAN SUFFRAGE FROM PROPERTY TO DEMOCRACY, 
1760-1860, at 49 (1960). 
11. IS'ee Tim F'EDERALisr No. 42, at 264-65 (J. Madison) (H. Lodge ed. 1892). 
12. K. PORTER, A HISTORY OF SUFFRAGE IN THE. UNITED STATES 3 (2d ed. 1971), 
Porter's examination of suffrage was written in 1918. That it was reprinted 
more than 50 years later is less a tribute to the quality of the study than 
an indication of the sparsity of more recent scholarly work in this area. 
13. C. WILLIAMSON, supra note 10, at 22-39. 
14. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874); 10 Qp, ATIY, 
GEN. 385-87 (1863) (citizenship), 
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colonies that many of the persons who voted as naturalized citizens 
would not be considered naturalized under anything like the stand-
ards we now enforce. 15 Moreover, the colonial laws and charters 
seldom imposed explicit political qualifications, in the sense of alle-
giance or citizenship. A number of the colonies did require that 
electors be freemen, but outside of New England, where the term 
had a technical meaning, the requirement was apparently read as 
"not slave." In New England the term denoted formal enrollment 
in the political community through a process that involved a resi-
dence requirement, the taking of an oath of allegiance, and in some 
cases even a vote of the other electors.16 
The term most often used to define the electors in the colonial 
charters and the early state constitutions was "inhabitants." A good 
deal of doubt exists as to the manner in which that term was ap-
plied. 17 The author of one survey of colonial election laws con-
cluded that as a general principle voting rights were not extended 
to persons considered foreigners.18 Another author identified sev-
eral colonies that did require voters to be English subjects.19 In 
1811 the Justices of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
declared that "inhabitant" was synonymous with "citizen" and thus 
under the state constitution only citizens could vote.20 Similarly, a 
15. See THE FEDERALIST No. 42, supra note 11, at 265; F. VAN DYNE, A TREA-
TISE ON THE LAW OF NATURALIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 6 (1907); cf. C. 
WILLIAMSON, supra note 10, at 87. 
16. Bishop, History of Elections in the American Colonies, in 3 STUDIES IN HIS-
TORY, EcONOMICS AND PUBLIC LAW 92-96 (1893). 
17. The term "inhabitants" was used in the Articles of Confederation in a man-
ner that illustrates this confusion. Article IV declared that "the free inhabitants 
of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice excepted, shall 
be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States; 
and the people of each State shall, in every other, enjoy all the privileges of trade 
and commerce." Madison noted that "[t]here is a confusion of language here, which 
is remarkable. Why the terms free inhabitants are used in one part of the article, 
free citizens in another, and people in another ... cannot easily be determined." 
THE FEDERALIST No. 42, supra note 11, at 265 (emphasis original). "Citizens" and 
"inhabitants" could be read as describing different but overlapping categories of per-
sons or as being synonymous. Madison evidently thought the first reading more 
plausible, but he strongly disapproved of the article under either interpretation. Id. 
18. A. MCKINLEY, THE SUFFRAGE FRANCHISE IN THE THIRTEEN ENGLISH COLO-
NIES IN AMERICA 474-75 (1905). See also s. MAcCLINTOCK, ALIENS UNDER THE 
FEDERAL LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 24 (1909). 
19. See Bishop, supra note 16, at 52-53. 
20. Opinion of the Justices, 7 Mass. 523, 525 (1811). See also Opinion of 
the Justices, 122 Mass. 594 (1877). Cf. 5 G. BANCROFT, HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA 201 (1888) ("for twelve years, free inhabitants and citizens 
were in American state papers convertible terms, sometimes used one for the other, 
and sometimes, for the sake of perspicuity, redundantly joined together"). 
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New Jersey judge writing in 1855 maintained that when the state's 
first constitution was adopted the term "citizen" was not yet in com-
mon use, but the term "inhabitants" described those persons who 
would subsequently be called citizens. 21 
Still, there is evidence indicating that some aliens were allowed 
to vote as "inhabitants" of the states in which they lived. Unnatural-
ized French Huguenots voted in South Carolina in the late seven-
teenth and early eighteenth centuries. 22 Unnaturalized German im-
migrants voted in Pennsylvania in the middle years of the eighteenth 
century, 23 and an early Pennsylvania decision upheld the right of an 
alien "inhabitant" to vote in a borough election in Pittsburgh, 24 just 
as a Vermont decision upheld the right of an alien resident to vote 
in a school election. 25 In 1840, a justice of the Illinois Supreme 
Court emphatically denied that the terms "citizen" and "inhabitant" 
were interchangeable26 and cited evidence of aliens voting as "in-
habitants" of the Northwest Territory pursuant to the Ordinance of 
1787 and subsequent congressional legislation.27 And it has been 
conceded by one historian who strongly disapproved of alien suffrage 
that "the rather vague qualification of citizenship existing in less than 
half a dozen colonies" during the pre-Revolutionary period dis-
appeared temporarily late in the eighteenth century.28 Yet it is pre-
cisely this period that marks the emergence of a national concept 
21. State v. Deshler, 25 N.J.L. 177, 186 (1855) (separate opinion of Haines, 
J.). 
22. A. McKINLEY, supra note 18, at 131-42; Bishop, supra note 16, at 53. 
23. C. WILLIAMSON, supra note 10, at 52. 
24. Stewart v. Foster, 2 Binn. 110 (Pa. 1809). 
25. Woodcock v. Bolster, 35 Vt. 632 (1863). 
26. Spragins v. Houghton, 3 Ill. (2 Scam.) 377 (1840). As counsel for appel-
lant, Stephen A. Douglas argued that an otherwise qualified alien was entitled under 
the state constitution to vote as an "inhabitant" of the state. Justice Smith's opinion 
(two other Justices concurred in the result) cited Michigan, Ohio, and Indiana as 
states (and, in an earlier period, territories) in which aliens had been allowed to 
vote. He acknowledged cases in other states, apparently New York and Massachu-
setts, where "inhabitant" and "citizen" were read as synonymous, but he dismissed 
these precedents out of hand. 
27. 3 Ill. (2 Scam.) at 403. The Ordinance of 1787 provided that "a freehold 
in fifty acres of land in the district, having been a citizen of one of the states, 
and being resident in the district, or the like freehold and two years residence in 
the district, shall be necessary to qualify a man as an elector of a representative." 
2 FEDERAL AND STATE CoNSTITUTIONS 959 (Thorpe ed. 1909). 
28. A. McCuLLOCH, SUFFRAGE AND !Ts PROBLEMS 36 (1929). See also K. 
PORTER, supra note 12, at 20. On June 7, 1776, the Continental Congress declared 
"that all persons abiding within any of the United Colonies and deriving protection 
from the laws of the same owe allegiance to the said laws, and are members of such 
colony." Quoted in F. FRANKLIN, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF NATURALIZATION IN 
THE UNITED STATES 2 (1906). 
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of citizenship. The Constitution itself declares that the President, 
representatives, and senators (though not judges) must be citizens 
of the United States, and in 1790 Congress passed a statute imple-
menting its power to provide for the naturalization of aliens and at 
the same time conferring United States citizenship on the foreign-
born children of American parents. 29 The passage of and contro-
versy over the Alien and Sedition Acts hardly suggests a lack of 
sensitivity to the difference between citizen and alien.30 Neverthe-
less, there was little effort in the latter part of the eighteenth 
century to declare specifically that only citizens could vote, and vot-
ing by unnaturalized aliens may well have been common during this 
period. 
Early in the nineteenth century the situation began to change. 
Whereas Ohio was admitted as a state in 1803 with a constitution 
that defined the electors as the inhabitants of the state, Louisiana's 
constitution at the time of its admission in 1812 spoke of the citizens 
as voters, as did the constitutions of Indiana ( 1816), Mississippi 
(1817), Alabama (1819), Maine (1820), and Missouri (1821). 
Illinois, admitted in 1818 with a constitution that identified the in-
habitants of the state as the electors, was the only exception to this 
pattern. It apparently allowed aliens to vote until a constitutional 
change in 1848.31 At the same time as the new states were defining 
the electors as citizens, the states previously admitted were moving 
in the same direction. Maryland changed its constitutional definition 
of voters from "inhabitants" to "citizens" in 1810, as did Connecticut 
in 1818, New York and Massachusetts in 1821, Vermont in 1828, 
and Virginia in 1830. The explanation for this increasing tendency 
to equate voting with citizenship may lie in the "rise of national 
consciousness" engendered by the War of 181232 or in the increasing 
29. Act of March 26, 1790, 1 Stat. 103. For naturalization the Act required 
two years of residence, proof of good moral character, and an oath to support the 
Constitution. 
30. But cf. A. McCuLLOCH, supra note 28, at 36 ("The absence of a test of 
citizenship for the franchise would indicate also that the American people were not 
yet politically conscious of being a new nation"). 
31. See Spragins v. Houghton, 3 Ill. (2 Scam.) 377 (1840) (settled interpretation 
of state constitution from its inception that alien inhabitants could vote). Article 
VI of the stace constitution of 1848 declared that the electors were to be the citizens 
of the state and those persons who were inhabitants of the state at the time of the 
adoption of the constitution. 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CoNSTITUTIONS, supra note 27, 
at 1002. 
32. See A. McCuLLOCH, supra note 28, at 41. Justice Smith's opinion in Spragins 
v. Houghton, 3 Ill. (2 Scam.) 377 (1840), see note 26 supra, refers to an unreported 
Ohio decision of 1817 upholding the denial of the vote in 1814 to a citizen of Great 
Britain named Johnston, even though, the opinion maintained, aliens were generally 
1098 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 75:1092 
public dismay at the arrival of large numbers of new immigrants who 
were not of English stock and who were thought incapable of ready 
assimilation. 
Ironically, at the same time that hostility to the foreignbom was 
producing strenuous demands in some states for literacy tests and 
other devices that would effectively exclude even naturalized immi-
grants from the polls, a significant movement was developing in other 
states to give aliens the vote. In 1848 Wisconsin was admitted as 
a state with a constitution that expressly extended the right of suf-
frage to aliens who had declared their intention of becoming citizens. 
The declaration that Wisconsin had in mind was to be made pursuant 
to the federal naturalization laws, which required for naturalization 
five-years' residence in the United States and a declaration of intent 
to become a citizen made two years before naturalization. The dec-
laration was not in any sense binding, and an alien who had made 
it could remain in the United States as an alien indefinitely. It has 
been suggested, however, that many of the supporters of the Wiscon-
sin scheme simply did not understand it, in that they assumed the 
declaration was somehow tantamount to naturalization or that it could 
only be made after two-years' residence, 33 when in fact the declara-
tion could be made at any time after arrival, but naturalization could 
not follow within a two-year period. In any case, the Wisconsin for-
mula proved attractive to other states, in part because they feared 
that failure to adopt the same rule would give Wisconsin a competi-
tive advantage in attracting immigrants.34 By the outbreak of the 
Civil War an alien declarant could vote in state and federal elections 
in Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Oregon, and Wisconsin. 
The extension of the franchise to aliens was a source of much 
unhappiness to those who feared that the new immigrants would 
have an adverse impact on American institutions. At a convention 
in February 1856, the Know-Nothing Party denounced Wisconsin 
and other states that had allowed aliens to vote. But their real con-
cern was not so much with aliens as with "foreigners," and their goal 
was to restrict the political power of all persons of foreign birth. The 
party's platform included a demand for a 21-year residence require-
allowed to vote in Ohio during this period. Although he did not have access to a 
written opinion disclosing the reasoning of the Ohio court, Justice Smith suggested 
that perhaps Johnston was denied the vote as an enemy alien, rather than as an 
alien simpliciter. 3 Ill. (2 Scam.) at 412-13. 
33. K. PORTER, supra note 12, at 120. 
34. See Chaney, Alien Suffrage, in 2 PUBLICATIONS OF THE MICH. POL. Sci. A. 
130, 134 (1894). 
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ment for naturalization. 35 But the practice of alien voting survived 
the attacks, and after the Civil War it spread to at least thirteen more 
states, all of them in the South or West and all of them evidently 
anxious to lure new settlers. 36 In each case the state adopted the 
Wisconsin formula and allowed alien declarants to vote, although 
some imposed a requirement of residence in the state for a certain 
period before or after the declaration. In addition, alien declarants 
were permitted to vote under the congressional legislation establish-
ing the territorial governments of Idaho, New Mexico, Oklahoma, 
Washington, and Wyoming. By the end of the nineteenth century 
nearly one-half of the states and territories had had some experience 
with voting by aliens, and for some the experience lasted more than 
half a century. 
The movement away from alien suffrage began late in the nine-
teenth century and continued into the twentieth, as the nation's hos-
tility to foreigners increased. The assassination of President McKin-
ley has been cited as a factor that moved some states away from alien 
suffrage, 37 and it was doubtless no accident that four of the last states 
to permit voting by aliens moved during the First World War to bar 
them from the polls.38 Indiana and Texas abolished alien suffrage 
35. See K. PORTER, supra note 12, at 128-29; F. FRANKLIN, supra note 28, at 
278-300. 
36. Determining precisely which states allowed aliens to vote is a difficult task. 
Thorpe's compilation of federal and state constitutions, supra note 27, is a convenient 
source of constitutional provisions bearing on the right to vote. It reveals that at 
one time or another the constitutions of Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, 
Georgia, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
and Texas extended the right of suffrage to aliens. In some cases, however, Thorpe 
provides only an amended version of a state constitution, and there is no way to 
tell on the face of it whether alien suffrage was at one time permitted. For ex-
ample, Minnesota's first constitution included an alien suffrage provision, MINN. 
CONST. of 1857, art. III, § 1; see City of Minneapolis v. Reum, 56 F. 576 (8th 
Cir. 1893 ), but Thorpe offers only an 1896 version of the article on elective fran-
chise, and in that year alien declarants lost the right to vote. 4 STATE AND FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 27, at 2007. Other states may have granted aliens a 
statutory right to vote even though the constitution of the state did not itself require 
alien suffrage. Few of the commentators make an effort to identify the particular 
states that allowed aliens to vote. See, e.g., Aylsworth, The Passing of Alien Suf-
frage, 25 AM. PoL. ScI. REV. 114 (1931) (noting that at least 22 states and terri-
tories at one time allowed aliens to vote, but not identifying more than a few of 
them). And some of those who have made the effort are in at least some instances 
simply wrong. Porter, for example, describes the Michigan constitutional convention 
of 1850 as narrowly defeating an alien suffrage provision. K. PORTER, supra note 
12, at 124-25. In fact, alien suffrage was established in the state constitution of 
1850, and it persisted until a constitutional amendment ended the practice in 1894, 
subject to a grandfather clause. 4 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 
27, at 1956. 
37. See A. McCULLOCH, supra note 28, at 53. 
38. By constitutional amendment alien suffrage was eliminated in Kansas, Ne-
1100 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 75: 1092 
in 1921, Missouri followed in 1924, and Arkansas brought the era 
to a close by ending alien suffrage in 1926. One commentator has 
pointed out that the election of 1928 was the first in more than a 
century in which no alien had the right to vote for any national, state 
or local office. 39 The irony of it all is that the disappearance of alien 
suffrage corresponded almost perfectly with the end of the era of 
open and unlimited immigration. At the same time that the national 
government was making it increasingly difficult to get into the 
United States, the states were taking political privileges away from 
the aliens who had managed to demonstrate the necessary qualifica-
tions and gain admission. 
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S POSITION ON 
ALIEN SUFFRAGE 
To my knowledge no state has seriously considered extending 
the franchise to aliens during the past half century, and I very much 
doubt that any state would now make the move except at the insist-
ence of the Supreme Court. And the Supreme Court's inclination 
on the issue is not at all in doubt. The Court has not been very 
helpful, however, in explaining why aliens have no right to vote. 
The issue was raised squarely in a recent Colorado case, Skafte v. 
Rorex, 40 and the Supreme Court refused to entertain an appeal from 
the state court's decision "that no such right exists. The order dismiss-
ing the appeal for want of a substantial federal question offered no 
explanation beyond a citation to two recent cases, Sugarman v. 
Dougall41 and Kramer v. Union Free School District. 42 In Sugarman, 
which held unconstitutional a blanket exclusion of aliens from New 
York's competitive civil service, Justice Blackmun's opinion for the 
Court had gone out of its way to address the question of alien voting: 
This Court has never held that aliens have a constitutional right to 
vote or to hold high public office under the Equal Protection Clause. 
Indeed, implicit in many of this Court's voting rights decisions is the 
notion that citizenship is a permissible criterion for limiting such 
rights.43 
braska, and South Dakota in 1918. A Texas statute of that same year barred aliens 
from voting in primary elections. See Aylsworth, supra note 36, at 115. 
39. Aylsworth, supra note 36, at 114. 
40. -Colo.-, 553 P.2d 830 (1976), appeal dismissed, 91 S. Ct. 1638 (1977), 
41. 413 U.S. 634 (1973 ). 
42. 395 U.S. 621 (1969). 
43. 413 U.S. at 648-49. 
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The issue of alien suffrage was not squarely presented in any of the 
cases cited by the Court. And while it is true that the Court has 
several times suggested that citizenship might be a permissible voter 
qualification, it has never made any significant effort to explain the 
basis for that suggestion. The only explanation offered in Sugarman 
is the rather puzzling remark that, even though state voter qualifica-
tions · are subject to scrutiny under the equal protection clause, "our 
scrutiny will not be so demanding where we deal with matters rest-
ing firmly within a State's constitutional prerogatives."44 I would 
have thought that the definition of a state's constitutional preroga-
tives in this regard was the question and not the answer. Justice 
Blackmun's opinion offers no further guidance. 45 
Kramer, the second of the cases cited in support of the dismissal 
of the Colorado appeal, had also been cited in Sugarman as one of 
the many cases in which it was "implicit . . . that citizenship is a 
permissible criterion" for limiting voting rights. The relevant text 
in Kramer is no help at all: 
At the outset, it is important to note what is not at issue in this case. 
The requirements of § 2012 that school district voters must (1) be 
citizens of the United States, (2) be bona fide residents of the school 
district, and (3) be at least 21 years of age are not challenged. Ap-
pellant agrees that the States have the power to impose reasonable 
citizenship, age, and residency requirements on the availability of the 
ballot.46 
44. 413 U.S. at 648. 
45. Justice Blackmun did go on to say, in apparent explanation of the quoted 
sentence concerning a state's constitutional prerogatives, that "[t]his is no more than 
a recognition of a State's historical power to exclude aliens from participation in 
its democratic political institutions." 413 U.S. at 648 (citing Pope v. Williams, 
193 U.S. 621, 632-34 (1904), and Boyd v. Thayer, 143 U.S. 135, 161 (1892) ). 
Pope, however, did not concern the right of aliens to vote. At issue was the right 
of a United States citizen who had recently moved from the District of Columbia 
to Maryland to vote in a Maryland election. Maryland had refused to register him 
because he had not, as required by state law, made a declaration at least one year 
before the attempted registration of his intent to become a citizen and resident of 
Maryland. The Supreme Court upheld the statute on the ground that state power 
to legislate ''upon the subject of the elective franchise" was "unassailable." 193 U.S. 
at 633-34. The Court went so far as to say that a state could constitutionally limit 
the right to vote to native-born (as opposed to naturalized) citizens. This view 
of limitless state power over the franchise is plainly repudiated in later cases, in 
particular Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969), and Dunn 
v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). 
Boyd v. Thayer, like Pope, did not address the question of alien suffrage. An 
attempt had been made to disqualify Boyd, the newly elected governor of Nebraska, 
from taking office. It was said that he was not a citizen of the United States and 
was therefore ineligible for the office under state law. By a tortuous process of 
reasoning the Court concluded that Boyd was, in fact, a citizen of the United States, 
and therefore it upheld his right to assume the office. 
46. 395 U.S. 621, 625 (1969) (emphasis original). 
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To disparage the Sugarman and Kramer discussions of the issue 
as dictum rather than holding is, if anything, to exaggerate their 
significance. In neither case did the Court state flatly that aliens 
have no constitutional right to vote, much less offer a rationale for 
that conclusion. What Sugarman did say clearly was that classifica-
tions on the basis of alienage are suspect, while Kramer declared 
that voting is a fundamental right. These two propositions are 
crucial to the alien's argument for a right to vote. By citing the dis-
cussion of alien voting in Sugarman and Kramer, the Supreme Court 
evidently wanted to show that even at the time it was formulating 
these propositions it did not believe that they could be carried to the 
point of establishing a right to vote for aliens. But that still leaves 
us in need of some explanation of the reasons why they cannot be 
carried that far. 47 
The Court could perhaps have provided an answer in Skafte v. 
Rorex by citing its 1974 decision in Richardson v. Ramirez.48 In 
that case, the Court rejected an equal protection challenge to state 
laws denying felons the right to vote, viewing section 2 of the four-
teenth amendment as dispositive of the issue. Section 2 declares 
that when a state denies the right to vote to male citizens of the 
United States who are at least twenty-one years old and who have 
not been convicted of a crime, the state's representation in Congress 
will be reduced in proportion to the number of such persons who 
have been denied the right to vote. Clearly, the section does not 
say that convicted felons have no right to vote. It provides only that 
a particular sanction for state interference with the right to vote-
reduction of congressional representation-will not be imposed 
where those who are denied the vote are former felons. Of course, 
the withholding of a sanction under section 2 is strong evidence that 
at the time the amendment was adopted the denial of the vote to 
felons was considered a legitimate exercise of state power. But 
standing alone, that evidence should not have proved fatal to the 
47. Another signal of the Supreme Court's views on the question of the alien's 
right to vote is its summary affirmance of a three-judge district court decision up• 
holding state and federal laws that exclude aliens from service on grand and petit 
juries. Perkins v. Smith, 426 U.S. 913 (1976), aftg. 370 F. Supp. 134 (D. Md. 
1974). The district court assumed for the sake of argument that strict scrutiny was 
the appropriate standard of review, but it found that the state and federal govern-
ments had a compelling interest in barring aliens from jury service. There is surely 
some basis for distinguishing the alien's interest in jury service from the interest 
in voting. Yet in view of the district court's apparent assumption that the federal 
and state governments have greater latitude in denying aliens political rights than 
civil or economic rights, it seems clear that the district court would also have upheld 
a statutory ban on the right of aliens to vote. 
48. 418 U.S. 24 (1974). 
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claim that the state law is now unconstitutional under the equal pro-
tection clause, since the Supreme Court has recognized that concepts 
of equality do evolve and that a practice deemed unobjectionable 
in 1868 may be impermissibly discriminatory today. 49 
In his opinion for the Court in Ramirez, Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
was careful to avoid relying on the argument-made several times 
by Mr. Justice Harlan but always rejected by the Court50-that sec-
tion 2 was intended to be the exclusive remedy for any form of elec-
toral discrimination. The fact that a discriminatory state practice 
could occasion the sanction of reduced congressional representation 
under section 2 of the fourteenth amendment does not, in other 
words, rule out the possibility that the practice could be completely 
enjoined under the equal protection clause of section 1. 51 But Mr. 
Justice Rehnquist argued in Ramirez that the withholding of a sanc-
tion under section 2 for the denial of the vote to convicted felons 
amounted to an implicit validation of state laws denying felons the 
vote, and he concluded that the equal protection clause of section 
1 was not applicable as a test of the law's validity. The dissenters 
pointed out that two years earlier the Supreme Court _had struck 
down under the equal protection clause laws imposing a durational 
residence qualification for voting, even though the durational resi-
dence qualification was considered just as acceptable in 1868 as the 
preclusion of voting by felons. 52 The difference, Mr. Justice Rehn-
quist replied, was that durational residence requirements were not 
explicitly exempted from the sanction of section 2, 53 although plainly 
they were implicitly exempted. Thus, although it was appropriate 
to test the durational residence requirement under the evolving 
standards of the equal protection clause, the analogous requirement 
that a voter have no felony conviction was immune from any equal 
protection scrutiny. 
As construed in Ramirez, section 2 of the fourteenth amendment 
disposes of the claim that a denial of the vote to aliens is unconsti-
tutional under section 1. Section 2 treats aliens and felons precisely 
alike-a state that denies the vote to aliens is just as free from any 
49. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966). 
SO. Compare Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965), and Reynolds v. Sims, 
377 U.S. 533 (1964), with 380 U.S. at 97-99 (Harlan, J. dissenting) and 377 U.S. 
at 593-615 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
51. See generally Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth Amendment, the "Right" To 
Vote, and the Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965 SUP. Cr. REV. 33. 
52. 418 U.S. at 76 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
53. 418 U.S. at 54. 
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sanction under section 2 as a state that denies the vote to felons. 
And if one must infer from the absence of a sanction under section 
2 that there can be no remedy under section 1, the aliens will inevit-
ably lose. 54 
In my view, the equal protection arguments for alien suffrage 
warrant serious consideration, Ramirez notwithstanding. In the first 
place, the Ramirez reading of section 2 may not endure. It goes 
well beyond anything required by the language, history, or purpose 
of the fourteenth amendment, 55 and it is hard to square with the 
Court's earlier rejection of Justice Harlan's argument that section 2 
ousts the equal protection clause in the area of voting rights. More-
over, even if section 2 is dispositive, it is not a very satisfying way 
to dispose of the case because it resolves the equal protection argu-
ments by making it unnecessary to consider them on the merits. If 
those arguments are as strong as I believe them to be, one can 
reasonably ask how equal protection analysis could have brought us 
to a point where, but for the deus ex machina of section 2, state 
laws denying aliens the vote would have to be held unconstitutional. 
Is section 2 an anachronism that unfortunately compels us to ignore 
the logic of the equal protection arguments, or is there something 
seriously wrong with those arguments? 
III. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIM 
A. The Standard of Review 
In the orthodox view, the world of equal protection review is 
divided into two parts-strict scrutiny, which few state statutes can 
evidently withstand, and restrained review, which most state statutes 
can handle very nicely. To gain access to the area of strict scru-
tiny, the challenger of the state statute must demonstrate either that 
54. In Skafte v. Rorex, - Colo. -, 553 P.2d 830 (1976), appeal dismissed, 
97 S. Ct. 1638 (1977), the Colorado case that denied the alien's right to vote, the 
state supreme court rejected the argument that § 2 of the fourteenth amend-
ment, as construed in Ramirez, was dispositive. The court argued that § 2 
was applicable only to the elections specifically mentioned in the section-elections 
for national political office and for state legislative, judicial, and executive offices. 
The election at issue in the Colorado case was a local school board election, to 
which the court found § 2 inapplicable. The court's conclusion seems sound, 
but it still leaves little room for the equal protection clause to operate. The court's 
second argument-that the implicit approval of a citizenship requirement in § 2 
does not warrant the conclusion that § 1 is inapplicable-is persuasive. Un-
fortunately, even though Ramirez is cited by the Colorado court as support for 
this argument, 553 P.2d at 832, the argument is clearly inconsistent with the Su-
preme Court's analysis in Ramirez. 
55. See, e.g., Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. 
L. REV. 293, 304 (1976). 
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the statute involves a suspect classification or that it denies a funda-
mental right. The denial to aliens of the right to vote would seem 
an obvious candidate for the stricter standard of review, because 
alienage stands near the top of the "suspectness" gradient (immedi-
ately next to race), and voting stands at the top of the gradient along 
which rights are laid out in order of their importance. If one had 
to imagine a case that called any more obviously for strict scrutiny, 
it would have to be the explicit denial of the vote to a racial minority. 
Of course, the system of equal protection analysis just described 
is in a state of considerable disarray. General agreement no longer 
exists on the number of different standards of review~ the rigor with 
which the rational basis test is to be applied, or the extent to which 
the fundamentality of the right is relevant to the choice of a standard 
of review. But much remains intact. Some classifications are still 
suspect, and alienage is plainly one of them. Although the right to 
vote no longer enjoys quite the special place it held a few years ago 
and the validity of any fundamental rights argument is now prob-
lematic, if any right is still considered fundamental it is the right to 
vote. And to pass the strict scrutiny test a statutory classification 
must still be predicated on a compelling state interest. Thus, despite 
all the confusion of the last few years, a statute withholding from 
aliens the right to vote would still seem to require testing under the 
rigorous standards of strict scrutiny. 
I don't think anyone knows precisely what combination of charac-
teristics makes a class suspect for purposes of equal protection 
analysis. But I have no doubt that a critical factor-perhaps the 
single most important factor-is political powerlessness. It is the 
discrete and insular minority, of which aliens as a class are a "prime 
example,"56 that obtains the benefit of heightened judicial solicitude, 
because such a minority requires "extraordinary protection from the 
majoritarian political process."57 The relaxed standard of review 
generally applicable to state legislation is said to rest on the presump-
tion of its constitutionality. And that presumption rests in tum o.n 
the expectation that all groups potentially affected by the legislation 
have had an opportunity to express their views and pursue their in-
terests in the legislative forum. Where a group is completely ex-
cluded from the legislative process the presumption of constitutional-
ity cannot stand, and therefore the courts must scrutinize with 
56. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (citing United States v. 
Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n. 4 (1938)). 
57. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). 
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unusual strictness legislation that disadvantages the group. A state 
statute or practice that has the purpose and effect of excluding the 
group from the political process clearly requires the strictest review 
of all, for it is the very fact of exclusion that made the classification 
suspect and necessitated strict scrutiny in the first place. 58 Put an-
other way, the invalidation of a statute that excludes the members 
of a suspect class from participation in the political process is itself 
a way of eliminating, over the long run to be sure, the need for strict 
scrutiny. By protecting the members of the class from the majority's 
efforts to keep them powerless, the Court can make its determination 
of suspectness self-liquidating. Over time the members of the class 
will develop the ability to protect their own interests in the legislative 
process, and the need for extraordinary judicial protection will then 
disappear. 
Even if alienage were not considered a suspect classification, 
strict scrutiny would still be the appropriate standard for reviewing 
state laws that deny aliens the right to vote. "The constitutional 
underpinnings of the right to equal treatment in the voting process 
can no longer be doubted even though . . . 'the right to vote in 
state elections is nowhere expressly mentioned.' "50 The protected 
position of the right to vote is based on a recognition that "[n]o right 
58. I am starting from the premise that alienage is a suspect classification and 
for that reason am assuming that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard for review 
of a statute denying aliens the vote. It might be thought, however, that the problem 
should be approached from another direction. That is, if one were to ask first 
whether aliens should be allowed to vote, and then, assuming the answer was in 
the negative, to ask whether alienage should therefore be considered a suspect classifi-
cation, it might seem possible to avoid strict scrutiny in reviewing the decision to 
deny them the vote. Under this view it is precisely the denial of the vote to aliens, 
for which the state presumably has a rational basis, that makes alienage a suspect 
classification and makes strict scrutiny analysis necessary in reviewing all subse-
quently imposed disabilities. See Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State, 71 Cal. 2d 566, 580 
& n.30, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77, 86 & n.30, 456 P.2d 645, 654 & n.30 (1969); cf. United 
States v. Thompson, 452 F.2d 1333, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 
998 (1972). But asking the questions in this order will not, in fact, eliminate the 
need for strict scrutiny in reviewing the denial of the vote. As I hope to show 
in a moment, the very fact that the state is attempting to enforce an absolute denial 
of the right to vote should itself be reason ,enough for strict scrutiny, whether or 
not the target group is specially protected under the suspect classification banner. 
Besides, the denial of the vote to aliens is not the only factor accounting for their 
relative powerlessness, and lack of political power is not the only argument that 
could be offered in support of the conclusion that alienage is a suspect classification. 
The classification might well be suspect, in other words, even if aliens had the right 
to vote. On that understanding, the denial of the vote can be upheld only if justified 
under the standards of strict scrutiny. 
59. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 34 n.74 (1973) 
(quoting Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 ( 1966) ). 
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is more precious in a free country" than the right to vote, 60 since 
voting is "preservative of all rights."61 To withhold the right to vote 
is to withhold the political power that would enable persons and 
groups to protect themselves in the legislative forum. The presump-
tion of constitutionality, which rests on the "assumption that the insti-
tutions of state government are structured so as to represent fairly 
all the people,"62 cannot operate where the state denies some per-
sons the vote, any more than it can operate where a state draws lines 
on the basis of a suspect classification. The citizenship qualification 
is not simply a means of diluting the votes of certain persons, 63 nor 
does it merely make it more difficult for certain persons to cast their 
ballots. 64 It is a means of totally excluding from the political process 
an identifiable segment of the population, 65 and as such it must be 
justified in terms of a compelling state interest. 66 
To be sure, many of the formulations of the right to vote speak 
expressly in terms of a right of citizens to participate on an equal 
basis with other citizens. 67 But since the cases have all involved 
60. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964). 
61. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). 
62. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 628 (1969). 
63. Cf. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) ("the right of suffrage can 
be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote"). 
64. Compare O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524 (1974), with McDonald v. Board 
of Election Commrs., 394 U.S. 802 (1969). 
65. Cf. Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 17 (1975); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 
755, 765-69 (1973); Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1, 5 (1971); Hunter v. Erickson, 
393 U.S. 385, 393 (1969). 
66. In Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 295 (1975), the Court described Kramer 
v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969), as holding that it is only qualifi-
cations on the right to vote other than those based on age, residence, or citizenship 
that must be justified in terms of a compelling state interest. But Kramer plainly 
did not hold that a citizenship qualification could be upheld under a lesser standard 
of review, since citizenship was not at issue in Kramer any more than it was in 
Hill. The opinion in Hill does not, in any case, offer any reason for testing a 
citizenship qualification under a different standard. In dissent, Justice Rehnquist 
pointed out that the Court had divided all voter qualifications into two categories: 
residence, age, and citizenship on the one hand, and all others on the other. He 
added that "this judicially created classification would itself scarcely survive a 'ra-
tional basis test,' unexplained as it is by any of our decisions." 421 U.S. at 306. 
67. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972); Kramer v. Union 
Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 
565 (1964). It is also true that the three constitutional amendments dealing directly 
with the qualifications of voters-the fifteenth (race), nineteenth (sex), and twenty-
sixth (age)-all refer to the voting rights of citizens, as opposed to persons. But 
the language of these amendments is without significance to the present inquiry. The 
latter two amendments speak in terms of citizenship because they deliberately track 
the verbal formula of the fifteenth amendment: "The right of citizens of the United 
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged . . . on• account of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude." And the amendments do not, in any case, purport 
to declare who will be the eligible electors, but only to rule out the use of certain 
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citizens, the references to the rights of citizens do not represent a 
holding that the right is one of citizens alone. Besides, many of the 
cases speak of the right as one of persons, not citizens. 08 The refer-
ences to citizenship should be taken, in my view, as rhetorical 
flourish. An impassioned declaration of the right of persons to vote 
does not have quite the force of the same plea on behalf of citizens. 
In any event, even if the references to citizens, as opposed to per-
sons, were advertent and deliberately designed to make citizens the 
exclusive beneficiaries of the right, what would be the legal or logical 
basis for that limitation? The only argument I can imagine is that 
voting is a right that springs from the privileges and immunities 
clauses of article IV or the fourteenth amendment. If valid, that 
argument would neatly dispose of the claim that it is persons, and 
not just citizens, who have a right to equal treatment in the voting 
process, since the clauses speak of the privileges and immunities of 
citizens. The problem with the argument, of course, is that the Su-
preme Court has emphatically denied that voting is a right or privi-
lege of state or national citizenship. 60 Indeed, the Court has fre-
quently denied that there is any such thing as a "right to vote." The 
references to that right are simply convenient shorthand for the right 
to "participate in state elections on an equal basis with other qualified 
voters whenever the State has adopted an elective process. "70 This 
right to equal treatment, as the voting rights cases have clearly 
acknowledged, is derived from the equal protection clause, which de-
criteria in deciding who will be allowed to vote. The reference to the rights of 
"citizens" in the fifteenth amendment is, of course, one more indication of the gen-
eral understanding during the Reconstruction period that aliens enjoyed no constitu-
tional right to vote. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 648 n.13 (1973 ). 
But that is a proposition I readily accept, and it is by no means fatal to the aliens' 
claim so long as one accepts the view that concepts of equality do evolve. See 
text at note 49 supra. Moreover, the drafters of the fifteenth amendment spoke 
in terms of the rights of citizens because they were working against the background 
of the Dred Scott decision, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), which had linked the 
civil and political rights of blacks with the question of citizenship. Professor Bickel 
has described the fourteenth amendment, with its definition of national citizenship 
in § 1, as a means of exorcising Dred Scott. A. BICKEL, THE MoRALilY OF 
CoNsENT 41 (1975). The wording of the fifteenth amendment serves that same 
end. 
68. See, e.g., Connor v. Finch, 97 S. Ct. 1828, 1830 (1977); Mahan v. Howell, 
410 U.S. 315, 319 (1973); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964); Gray v. 
Sanders, 372 U.S. 368,381 (1963). 
69. See Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 632 (1904); Minor v. Happersett, 88 
U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874). But compare Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 149 
(1970) (separate opinion of Douglas, J.), with 400 U.S. at 213-14 (Harlan, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part). 
70. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 n.78 (1973). 
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clares that no state shall deny any person the equal protection of the 
laws. 71 It is precisely the distinction between citizens, who are the 
beneficiaries of the privileges and immunities clause, and persons, 
who enjoy the protection of the equal protection clause, that has 
made possible the invalidation under the latter clause of statutes that 
discriminate against aliens. 72 • If the right to equal treatment in the 
electoral process owes its origin to the equal protection clause, and 
it undeniably does, then whatever the dicta in earlier cases it must 
be persons and not just citizens who enjoy that right. 73 That is not 
to say that aliens have an unqualifiable right to vote. The equal 
protection clause does not stand in the way of a state decision to 
withhold the vote from aliens or any other group of persons·, provided 
that the state decision can pass the rigorous test of strict scrutiny. 
B. The State Interest in Denying Aliens the Vote 
On the assumption that strict scrutiny is the appropriate test for 
measuring the validity of a statute denying aliens the vote, the statute 
71. The only exception is Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), the reappor-
tionment case involving congressional districting. The Court found the governing 
principle in neither the equal protection clause nor the privileges and immunities 
clause, but rather in article I, § 2 of the Constitution, which provides that represen-
tatives shall be chosen "by the People of the several States." 
72. A. BICKEL, supra note 67, at 42-48. 
73. If the right to vote belongs to citizens alone, then it might be said that an 
extension of the franchise to aliens would not only go beyond anything required 
by the Constitution but would itself be unconstitutional. Enlarging the elector-
ate to include persons other than citizens would water down the vote of citizens 
in much the same way as malapportionment. Cf. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 
208 n.88 (1970) (opinion of. Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(posing the question whether the lowering of voter qualifications unconstitution-
ally dilutes the votes of those meeting the higher standards). The problem with 
that argument is that apportionments are now generally worked out on the basis 
of census tabulations of the total population-citizens and aliens, voters and nonvot-
ers. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 746-47 (1973); cf. Burns v. Richard-
son, 384 U.S. 73, 92-93 (1966). Even the division of seats in Congress among 
the states is based on total population, 2 U.S.C. § 2a{a) (1970), although there 
has been at least one effort to exclude aliens from the base by constitutional amend-
ment. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1946, at 1, col. 6. The citizen who lives 
in a district where there are many aliens now has a vote that is greater in weight 
than the vote of a citizen who lives in a district with fewer aliens. Cf. Note, Student 
Voting and Apportionment: The "Rotten Boroughs' of Academia, 81 YALE L.J. 35, 
47 (1971) (citizen who lives in district with many students has more voting power 
than a citizen who lives in a district with fewer students). The citizen casts his 
own vote and also the vote of his disenfranchised alien neighbor. The resulting 
disparity in the voting strength of citizens is evidently viewed by the Supreme Court 
as too trivial to require correction. But surely if a state were to correct the problem 
by allowing aliens to cast their own votes, the effort could not be viewed as incon-
sistent with the spirit of the reapportionment decisions. 
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can be upheld only if the state is able to demonstrate that it serves 
a compelling state interest. Plainly, every state discerns some inter-
est in excluding aliens from the polls, since every state does in fact 
bar them from voting. But it is not enough that such statutes 
"further a very substantial state interest."74 The end must be 
legitimate; the statute must be drawn with precision and tailored 
carefully to serve the state's objectives; and there must be no less 
drastic means of serving those objectives. 
It is important to keep in mind certain characteristics of the aliens 
whose right to vote is at issue. My concern is the right to vote of 
resident aliens. I have no quarrel with a state's conclusion that non-
resident aliens should be excluded from the polls. For this purpose 
the term nonresident has significance under both state and federal 
law. It is clear that only aliens domiciled in the state-residents as 
a matter of state law-have a substantial claim to the right to vote. 
If a state can exclude nonresident citizens from voting, its power to 
exclude nonresident aliens is surely no less. Moreover, it is only 
the resident alien, as defined by the federal immigration laws, whose 
rights are at issue here. A resident alien is an immigrant admitted 
to the United States for permanent residence, entitled to work and 
live anywhere in the country. During the past 50 years resident 
aliens have been admitted to the United States in limited numbers-
currently, about 400,000 each year75-and only after passing two 
careful screenings, one by an overseas consular official who issues the 
immigrant visa and the other by the immigration official who inspects 
the alien at the port of entry. Resident aliens are on a citizenship 
track-after five years they are eligible for naturalization. Their 
right to remain in the United States does not depend, however, on 
their obtaining citizenship. They serve in the armed forces and were 
subject to conscription under the selective service laws. 70 They 
74. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972). 
75. By contrast, the number of nonresident aliens admitted for temporary periods 
each year exceeds 3 million. E. HARPER, IMMIGRATION LAws OF THE UNITED STATES 
668 (3d ed. 1975). 
76. See generally 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW & PROCE· 
DURE § 2.49 (rev. ed. 1977). An alien who left the United States to avoid military 
service would incur the penalty of perpetual exclusion from the country. 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(22) (1970). In general, the United States has not conscripted nonim-
migrant aliens under the selective service laws. As of January 1, 1971, federal reg-
ulations exempted most classes of nonimmigrants, including foreign students, offi-
cials of foreign governments, journalists, and exchange visitors, from the duty to 
register with the selective service. See 32 C.F.R. § 1611.2(b)(l)-(11) (1971). See 
also 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 453, 454 (1970); Comment, The Status of Aliens Under 
United States Draft Laws, 13 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 501 (1972). 
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pay taxes precisely like citizens of the United States. They enjoy 
no immunity from state or federal criminal law. Resident aliens 
enter the United States with the intention of making this country 
their home, and it appears that the great majority of them remain 
here indefinitely. Nonresident aliens, by contrast, are admitted to 
the United States for strictly limited periods of time that are deter-
mined before they enter the United States. Included in the category 
of nonresident aliens are officials of foreign governments, temporary 
visitors for business or pleasure, foreign students, temporary workers 
and trainees, foreign journalists, and many others who are neither 
expected nor permitted to remain in this country indefinitely. 
What is the basis, then, for the state's determination that resident 
aliens should not share the franchise with resident citizens? The 
states are said to have broad power to preserve "the basic conception 
of a political community,"77 and one might suppose that aliens-by 
• definition, strangers or outsiders-need not be defined as included 
within the community, any more than residents of another state or 
minor children need be so included. The validity of that conclusion 
may seem obvious, but the articulation of the reasoning underlying 
it is no easy task. 
The denial of the vote to aliens might be thought to rest on a 
finding that aliens, even resident aliens, have a lesser stake than 
citizens in national, state, and local issues. Differences in the st~ke 
that potential voters have in the outcome of elections can apparently 
be taken into account by a state in deciding who will be allowed to 
vote and who will not, 78 provided that there is a "genuine difference 
in the relevant interests of the groups that the state electoral classi-
fication has created."79 In Kramer v. Union Free School District,80 
the Supreme Court struck down a statute limiting the right to vote 
in school district elections to those who owned or leased real property 
in the district or were parents of children enrolled in the public 
schools. The Court concluded that the statute did not accomplish 
with sufficient precision its goal of limiting the political community 
to those directly affected by school affairs. The statute's classifica-
77. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 344 (1972). See Sugarman v. Dougall, 
413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973). 
78. See Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 
719 (1973). 
79. Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action, 97 S. Ct. 1047, 1053 
(1977). 
80. 395 U.S. 621 (1969). 
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tion included as voters many persons "who have, at best, a remote 
and indirect interest in school affairs," while at the same time it ex-
cluded others "who have a distinct and direct interest in the school 
meeting decisions."81 As a test of stake in the decisions of govern-
ment, a classification based on alienage is far more imprecise than 
the classification held invalid in Kramer. Resident aliens drive on 
the same highways as citizens, pay the same taxes, breathe the same 
air, require the same police and fire protection, and send their chil-
dren to the same schools. To deny them the right to vote is, in the 
language of Kramer, to leave them without "any effective voice in 
the governmental affairs which substantially affect their lives."82 
I should make clear, however, that· the case for alien suffrage 
does not rest on the proposition that every person affected by gov-
ernment policy must have a voice in its formulation. Kramer v. 
Union Free School District does not establish that proposition, and 
its ramifications, if true, would be very great. The decisions of a 
city council, for example, may have a direct impact on a great many 
persons who now have no right to vote for the members of the 
council: transients, residents of neighboring communities, children, 
and others besides resident aliens. Yet the resident aliens' claim 
need not stand or fall with the claims of these other groups, as I 
hope to make clear by briefly contrasting the position of the resident 
aliens with that of these other groups. 
The transient's interest, though often substantial, is distinguish-
able from that of the resident, whether citizen or alien, because the 
transient will predictably have a different view of short-run benefits 
and long-run costs than will persons who intend to reside in the com-
munity indefinitely. Drawing lines on the basis of that distinction 
is difficult, and the courts have recognized the potential for abuse 
where the label of transiency is casually applied. They have viewed 
with increasing skepticism state claims that particular segments of the 
population, students for example, are just passing through and lack a 
sufficient stake in the community to deserve the vote. 83 In the case of 
resident aliens (as opposed to nonresident aliens), there can be no 
doubt that the transient label is inappropriate. Resident aliens have 
the same stake as citizens in the long-range welfare of the communi-
81. 395 U.S. at 632. 
82. 395 U.S. at 627. Sec Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 
(1969). 
83. See Whatley v. Clark, 482 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 
934 (1974); Ramey v. Rockefeller, 348 F. Supp. 780 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Newburgcr 
v. Peterson, 344 F. Supp. 559 (D.N.H. 1972). 
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ties in which they live. They may, to be sure, move from one ~om-
munity to another, and some will return to their country of origin. 
But citizens also move, and I know of no reason to believe that resi-· 
dent aliens have a higher rate of mobility than other persoris. Like· 
citizens (and unlike nonresident aliens), their right to remain in their 
communities is unlimited by any state or federal law. They are not 
subject to removal at the caprice of government officials. They can be 
deported, of course, but only by action of the federal government 
and only under exceptional circumstances. If the resident alien is 
a transient because of the possibility of deportation, then citizens 
should also be considered transients because of the possibility of re-
moval to prison upon conviction of a crime. 
In contrast to resident aliens, who settle in communities of their 
choice and depart only when they prefer to live elsewhere, soldiers 
have relatively little control over the places in which they live. 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has rejected the argument that 
soldiers can be denied the vote on the theory that they lack a sufficient 
commitment to the future of the communities in which they are 
stationed. If soldiers reside in a state with an intention to make it 
their home, "they, as all other qualified residents, have a right to an 
equal opportunity for political representation."84 The alien who has 
established bona fide residence in the community is surely no more a 
transient than the soldier. 85 
Just as transients may be excluded from the definition of the 
political community, residents of neighboring communities may be, 
and routinely are, excluded as well. Yet the ramifications of a gov-
ernmental decision cannot always be confined within geographic 
boundaries, and nonresidents will often find themselves affected by 
decisions in which they did not participate. It may be impossible, 
moreover, to dismiss their interests, like those of transients, as 
ephemeral. A decision to construct an airport or shopping center 
in one corner of a city may have a direct, substantial, and long-range 
impact on the interests of persons who live near the site but outside 
the city limits and who have no role in the election · of the. public 
officials who make the decision. Still, the geographic line--for· all 
its arbitrariness-is far more easily defended than a line drawn on 
the basis of citizenship. The nonresident will only occasionally feel 
the impact of decisions made in adjacent cities, and the physical 
84. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965). 
85. Cf. Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970) (residents of federal enclave 
entitled to vote in state elections). 
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separation will often attenuate the impact, where there is any at all. 
The same line that divides the community of possible voters also 
divides the community of possible taxpayers. Nonresidents do not 
participate directly in the decision, but by the same token they do 
not pay the taxes that finance the programs approved. Resident 
aliens, by contrast, pay taxes along with other residents of the com-
munity, and they lack the protection from the impact of decision that 
distance affords the nonresident. Moreover, the drawing of an arbi-
trary geographic line can be justified in large part by the need to 
draw a line somewhere. 86 The governmental action of a community 
can affect not only persons who live immediately outside its borders, 
but also on occasion those who live a few hundred or even a few 
thousand miles away. If the right to vote must be extended to every 
person touched by these effects, there may be no stopping point short 
of what would be quite literally universal suffrage. 
The same line drawing problem does not exist with respect to 
resident aliens. The logic of allowing them to vote does not require 
the extension of the vote to limitless numbers of persons who live 
far from the epicenter of the decision and who may have only the 
slightest and most theoretical interest in local affairs. And unlike 
nonresidents, aliens have no place to turn for representation of their 
views. Nonresidents have influence in their own communities, and 
they may be able to persuade their elected representatives to convey 
their views to the decisionmakers on the other side of the geographic 
line. They also participate in the election of representatives to 
higher levels of government-county, state, and national-that may 
have power to grant relief. Aliens, on the other hand, can look only 
to their countries of origin, and they are unlikely to find any sub-
stantial help in that direction. As nonresidents of their own coun-
tries they probably have no vote or political influence there either. 
And the very fact that they have emigrated to the United States may 
produce an attitude of nonchalance, or worse, on the part of govern-
ment officials in the countries they have left. Besides, the issues 
on which they need representation will often have no significance in 
their countries of origin. It is not so much their interest as aliens 
that needs protection, but their interest as parents, homeowners, tax-
payers, draftees, and consumers. The governments of the countries 
they have left behind are unlikely to see any benefit for themselves 
86. See Note, The Right To Vote in Municipal Annexations, 88 HARV, L. REV, 
1571, 1577-78 (1975). 
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in representing these interests, and the likelihood that such represen-
tation would prove effective in any case is obviously very small. 
A third group routinely denied the vote is children, and they un-
doubtedly can have the same direct long-range interest in the wel-
fare of their communities as resident aliens. The exclusion of chil-
dren from the franchise is itself a subject of much controversy, how-
ever, and the concern about the exclusion has constitutional dimen-
sions. 87 Moreover, children do not bear all of the obligations (tax-
paying, military service, and the rest) that are imposed on the adult 
residents, whether citizen or alien, of the community. Indeed, the 
principal argument for lowering the voting age to eighteen was that 
this age marks the assumption of these obligations more accurately 
than the age of twenty-one. And even though children have no for-
mal voice in the making of government decisions that may affect 
them, their parents do have such a voice and presumably will under-
take much of the responsibility for representing the interests of their 
children. The resident alien has no comparable representative. 
The denial to aliens of the right to vote cannot be justified on 
the theory that aliens as a class lack the necessary stake or interest 
in governmental affairs. A possible alternative rationale is that 
aliens have qualities that interfere with their ability to vote intelli-
gently or responsibly. At least four different claims seem possible-
that aliens will become involved in vote fraud, that aliens will vote 
as a bloc and tip the political balance in favor of positions they sup-
port, that aliens lack the knowledge of national and local affairs that 
is needed to cast an intelligent vote, and that aliens cannot be trusted 
with the vote because they lack loyalty to the United States and its 
political and social institutions. 
l. Vote Fraud 
The first of these arguments can be dismissed quickly. Although 
the state interest in preventing vote fraud is doubtless compelling, 88 
there is no reason whatsoever to believe that aliens are more likely 
than citizens to lie about their residence, sell their votes, or stuff 
ballot boxes. In any case, the primary responsibility for preventing 
fraud at the polls does and should rest on the statutes that impose 
87. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 240 (1970) (opinion of Brennan, 
White, and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
88. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 345 (1972). 
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criminal penalties for such fraud. 611 Surely these statutes need be 
no less effective against aliens than they are against citizens. 
2. Bloc Voting 
The second possible claim is that aliens should be excluded from 
the polls because they are likely to vote as a bloc. If the vice of 
bloc voting is that it will substantially compound the harm of having 
aliens cast their votes without sufficient knowledge of the issues and 
adequate loyalty to the institutions of the United States, its serious-
ness depends on the validity of the assumption that aliens would, in 
fact, lack the necessary knowledge and loyalty. The validity of that 
assumption is a question to which I will turn in a moment. But what 
of the argument that bloc voting is harmful in itself-that it is a vice 
to be avoided even on the assumption that aliens would have the 
intelligence and loyalty required to vote responsibly? Although it 
may seem unlikely that any state would exclude aliens from the polls 
in reliance on such an argument, I suspect that it is one of the most 
plausible explanations for the unwillingness to grant aliens the vote. 
In terms of social and economic position, aliens may be less diverse 
than the population as a whole. 00 And their common experience 
of giving up a homeland in another country, migrating to the United 
States, and learning to cope with life here may tend to produce a 
considerable similarity of viewpoint on important public issues. To 
a legislator who is trying to decide whether aliens should be allowed 
to vote; the argument that they lack knowledge and loyalty is likely 
to be much less impressive than the argument that they are likely 
to vote in unison in support of positions that he opposes. To take an 
obvious example, in the controversy over alien suffrage before the Civil 
War, the aliens' attitude toward slavery was an important factor. One 
historian has pointed out that "[n]o matter how ignorant and stupid 
89. See 405 U.S. at 353-54. 
90. Historically aliens as a class have probably been less skilled and less edu-
cated than the population as a whole. But given the stringent immigration qualifi-
cations now in effect, a high percentage of new immigrants are very highly skilled. 
A system of immigration preferences was established for the Eastern Hemisphere in 
1965, Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (codified at 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1101, 1151 et seq. (1970)). As a result of the emphasis on skills in the occupa-
tional categories, Eastern Hemisphere immigrants are "much more likely to be highly 
trained or professional workers than are immigrants from any other area." Abrams 
& Abrams, Immigration Policy~Who Gets In and Why?, 38 THE Pua. INTEREST 
3, 17 (1975). The system of priorities has now been carried over to the Western 
Hemisphere, and more Western Hemisphere immigrants will be subject to the labor 
certification requirements. See Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-571, 90 Stat. 2703 (1976). Thus, the overall level of skills 
should rise. 
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the immigrant might be, he was more than likely to be sure of one 
thing-that he did not believe in holding slaves. He could not dis-
cuss states' rights, theories of sovereignty, and nullification, but he 
was unequivocally opposed to the slaveholder."01 It was surely no 
accident that none of the Southern states extended the franchise to 
aliens before the Civil War, whereas alien declarants were specif-
ically allowed to vote under the Reconstruction constitutions of Ala-
bama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, and Texas. 
The fear that aliens will vote as a bloc and that bloc voting will 
prove harmful in itself cannot provide an adequate basis for the dis-
enfranchisement of aliens. Even if there were evidence that aliens 
would vote as a bloc, the goal of stifling bloc voting would be illegiti-
mate. The Supreme Court has repeatedly insisted that the states 
are barred from " '[f]encing out' from the franchise a sector of the 
population because of the way they may vote."02 It may be true 
that aliens are much more likely than citizens to favor, for example, 
high tariffs or low taxes or increased aid for urban areas, but the 
desire to forestall the concentrated expression of these views is not 
a constitutionally permissible reason for denying aliens the right to 
vote. 
3. Lack of Knowledge Needed To Vote Intelligently 
The claim that aliens lack the knowledge to vote intelligently is 
plainly more difficult. The interest in insuring the knowledgeability 
of voters is apparently legitimate,93 at least so long as the state does 
not attempt to limit the franchise to those who have an understanding 
of the "local viewpoint."04 But to uphold a voter qualification rule 
on the basis of this interest, the state must demonstrate that its classi-
fication is carefully tailored to the objective. It may well be true 
that immigrants who have arrived recently in the United States will 
know little about this country's institutions of government or about 
the issues on which election campaigns are fought. As a general 
proposition, long-time residents of a community are always likely to 
91. K. PoRTER, supra note 12, at 130. Cf. F. FRANKLIN, supra note 28, at 47 
(discussing opposition to passage of Naturalization Act of 1790 on grounds that 
aliens opposed to slavery would be admitted). 
92. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965). See also, e.g., Cipriano v. City 
of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969). 
93. Cf. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959) 
(literacy test not invalid on its face). 
94. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 355 (1972). 
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be more knowledgeable about local affairs than newcomers. This 
difference in relative understanding of local issues makes rational a 
durational residence requirement for voting. But rationality is not 
enough in the sensitive area of voting rights, as the Supreme Court 
made clear in striking down such requirements in Dunn v. Blum-
stein. 95 A classification in terms of length of residence is simulta-
neously under- and over-inclusive. It excludes some newcomers who 
are as knowledgeable about local affairs as long-time residents, and 
it includes some long-time residents who are as ignorant of local af-
fairs as newcomers. As expensive as it may be to separate the 
knowledgeable newcomers from the unknowledgeable, the state can-
not constitutionally withhold the right to vote from all new residents 
in the service of some "remote administrative benefit."96 
The citizenship qualification for voting is undeniably a form of 
durational residence requirement. And it is a requirement of ex-
ceptional severity, since immigrants are ordinarily ineligible for 
citizenship until they have resided in the United States for five years. 
To be sure, the citizen who takes up residence in a new state imme-
diately before an election, and who is therefore the beneficiary of 
the Dunn ruling, is in a somewhat different position from the alien, 
who is a new resident of the country as well as of the state. Never-
theless, the analogy between the durational residence requirement 
struck down in Dunn and the denial of the vote to aliens is close 
enough to raise considerable doubt about the effort to sustain that 
denial on the argument that alien newcomers lack the knowledge 
required of good voters. 
Dunn upheld the right of new residents to vote in state and local 
elections as well as elections for national offices. It is not at all clear 
that a New Yorker who moves to Texas and votes in a local election 
soon after arrival will be any more knowledgeable about local issues 
than a citizen of France who moves to the United States and takes 
up residence in Texas. The knowledge will be acquired if there 
is a reason for acquiring it and if the opportunity to acquire it is at 
hand. With regard to the reason for gaining the knowledge, one 
cannot distinguish the alien newcomer from the citizen newcomer. 
They both have a stake in the outcome of local elections. They both 
pay taxes and send their children to the public schools. If an issue 
arises that concerns the level of taxation in the community or the 
95. 405 U.S. 330 (1972). 
96. 405 U.S. at 351 (quoting Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965)). 
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quality of the schools, the alien newcomer is no more likely to view 
the issue with indifference than is the citizen newcomer. But per-
haps the difference between the two is in the ability and opportunity 
to gain the necessary information, as opposed to the desire to obtain 
it. Dunn implicitly recognizes that a very substantial part of voter 
education takes place in the days immediately preceding an election. 
And the principal educators are the candidates for public office and 
their supporters. The candidates will make an effort to reach out 
to potential voters to explain their positions, not because of any com-
mitment to voter education in the abstract, but because they want 
their votes. If aliens have votes to offer, the candidates will come 
to them. The contest for their votes will inevitably produce a sub-
stantial amount of political education and instruction on the issues. 
Of course, the state's fear may be that alien newcomers will lack 
the knowledge of local issues that is necessary to appreciate the 
subtleties of the debate. And they may miss the debate entirely if 
they cannot understand the English language. But again the classi-
fication is grossly over-inclusive. The great majority of aliens are 
literate in some language, if not English, since literacy has been a 
prerequisite to admission for almost all immigrants since Congress im-
posed the requirement97 over President Wilson's veto in 1917. Be-
sides, a substantial amount of voter education already takes place in 
languages other than English.98 The Voting Rights Act Amend-
ments of 1975,99 which suspend the use of literacy tests and devices 
that can effectively disenfranchise members of a language minor-
ity,100 rest on the premise that there is no necessary correlation be-
tween intelligent voting and the ability to speak or read the English 
language. 
Moreover, it is hardly the case that all or even most resident 
aliens are unable to speak English. In addition to the immigrants 
who were raised in English-language countries or educated in 
English-language schools, there are a great many aliens who have 
97. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(25) (1970). The literacy qualification applies to 
most prospective immigrants who are at least 16 years of age and physically capable 
of reading. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(b) (1970). · 
98. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 654-55 & n.15 (1966); Cardona 
v. Power, 384 U.S. 672, 675-76 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Puerto Rican Or-
ganization for Political Action v. Kusper, 350 'F. Supp. 606 (N.D. Ill. 1972), affd., 
490 F.2d 575 (7th Cir. 1973). 
99. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq. (1970 & Supp. V 1975). 
100. For a list of the states and counties covered by the minority language pro-
visions of the Voting Rights Act, see U.S. CoMMN. ON ClvIL RIGHTS, USING THE 
VonNG RIGHTS Acr 16-20 (1976). 
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learned English since their arrival in the United States.101 The great 
majority of aliens have lived in the United States for years, and they 
are likely to have gained some understanding of English and some 
familiarity with American political processes during their residence 
here. The citizenship requirement for voting assumes that it will 
take at least five years of residence to gain the understanding needed 
to vote intelligently in an American election. Whether or not that 
was true of all aliens a century ago, when television and other mod-
ern sources of information were not available and a rather high pro-
portion of new immigrants was illiterate, 102 it is certainly not true 
for all aliens today. A great many will have gained whatever under-
standing is necessary long before the five years have elapsed. 
But what if the knowledge a state expects its voters to have is 
not the sort that can be acquired in the period immediately preced-
ing an election, even by a person who speaks English well and is 
anxious to learn? Perhaps the state is looking for a subtler kind of 
knowledge-for example, an understanding of the history of the 
United States, and in particular an ability to see the issues of the 
day in their historical context; an appreciation of the role of politi-
cal institutions, especially political parties; and an ability to look be-
hind ideological debate in order to discern the real clash of interests 
that underlies it. To return to the example of the immigrant who 
opposed slavery but knew nothing of nullification or theories of sov-
ereignty, it may be that the state's goal is precisely to insure that 
voters will cast their ballots on the basis of some understanding of 
concepts like nullification and state sovereignty. A substantial num-
ber of aliens may, in fact, lack that kind of understanding even after 
years of residence in the United States. But few citizens have that 
kind of knowledge either. The classification, in other words, is seri-
ously under-inclusive. Naturalization is not predicated on a demon-
stration of this kind of knowledge, and the naturalized citizen is not 
presumptively more likely to have it than the unnaturalized alien. 
Nor could very many native-born citizens meet this exacting stan-
dard. It seems unlikely, therefore, that this standard is what the state 
has in mind when it bars aliens from voting. And if it is, the classifi-
101. The number of permanent resident aliens in the country as of January 1975 
has been estimated at 4,255,725. Of these, 325,410 were nationals of Canada and 
289,674 of Great Britain. [1975] INS ANN. REP. 21. Another 868,198 were 
nationals of Mexico, id., and many of them live in areas where Spanish is almost 
an official second language. Cf. Faruki v. Rogers, 349 F. Supp. 723, 731 (D.D.C. 
1972). 
102. See U.S. IMMIGRATION CoMMN., .ABSTRACI' OF REPORTS, s. Doc. No. 
747, 61st Cong., 3d Sess. 98-100 (1911) (Dillingham Commission Report). 
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cation is simply not tailored to fit the objective with anything like 
the kind of precision that the strict scrutiny standard demands. 
The classification produces two types of mistakes: it allows some 
uninformed persons to vote, and it prevents some well-informed per-
sons from voting. Since we deny the vote to all aliens, the only mis-
take we can make with regard to this group is that of excluding a 
well-informed person from the polls. If the proportion of aliens who 
are well informed is greater than one-half, the classification is com-
pletely irrational, for it produces a greater number of mistakes than 
would result from adopting the opposite rule and allowing all aliens 
to vote. (I am assuming that withholding the vote from an informed 
person is considered at least as serious a mistake as offering the vote 
to an uninformed person.) But even assuming that the proportion 
of aliens who can meet the knowledge standard, however lenient it 
may be, is less than one-half, one still ought to determine the 
proportion of citizens that has the necessary knowledge. The pro-
portion with the necessary knowledge may be no greater than the 
counterpart proportion of aliens. If so, one can reasonably ask why 
aliens are singled out for special treatment. And if fewer than one• 
half of all citizens have the knowledge we are after, we could re-
duce the overall number of mistakes by changing our rule for 
citizens and excluding them all from the polls. It may seem prepos-
terous to eliminate all elections, but the only alternative would be 
to concede that knowledgeability is not really the quality upon which 
we are insisting. 
Yet even if one makes the fairly generous assumption that, say, 
75% of all citizens have the necessary knowledge, whereas only 
20 % of all resident aliens could meet the standard, it would seem 
essential, considering that the standard of review is strict scrutiny, 
to go on and consider the relative size of the two populations. There 
are approximately 4 million resident aliens in the United States, and 
of these slightly more than 3 million are of voting age. About 80 
million citizens voted in the 1976 presidential election. Assuming 
that 20% of the aliens are well enough informed to vote intelli-
gently, we make 600,000 mistakes by excluding each of the 3 mil-
lion adult aliens from the polls. If we allowed all 3 million to vote, 
the number of mistakes would jump to 2.4 million (assuming that 
all would actually vote), since 80% of the aliens are presumed to 
be uninformed. The net increase in the number of mistakes would 
be 1.8 million. It is important to note, however, that we are already 
admitting to the polls a large number of uninformed voters. On the 
assumption that 25 % of all citizens lack the necessary knowledge, 
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the number of uninformed voters for the 197 6 presidential election 
would be approximately 20 million. 
I do not mean to adopt a cavalier attitude toward the addition 
of 2.4 million uninformed aliens to the voter rolls. Even one vote 
can decide an election, and 2.4 million votes would provide a healthy 
margin of victory in some presidential contests. But putting that 
number alongside the 20 million mistakes that I am assuming we 
already tolerate, one gets a better sense of the potential costs of al-
lowing all aliens to vote. If we can live with 20 million uninformed 
voters, it is not altogether clear how one could demonstrate a com-
pelling interest in preventing another 2.4 million uninformed persons 
from going to the polls. Allowing aliens to vote, even on the very 
generous assumption that few aliens have the necessary knowledge 
whereas almost all citizens do, would increase the proportion of un-
informed votes among the total number cast from 25% to 27% .103 
I have no doubt that it would be rational to minimize the total num-
ber of mistakes by excluding all aliens. But what the state must 
show is need, not just rationality. And assuming that some 20 
million uninformed citizens are already going to the polls, there is 
substantial reason to doubt that the real purpose of the disqualifica-
tion of aliens is, in fact, to deny the vote to the uninformed. 
I have argued in the preceding paragraphs that it is better to 
admit all aliens to the polls than to exclude them all, even assuming 
that a large majority lack the knowledge to cast an intelligent vote. 
It may seem that I have made the case for alien suffrage needlessly 
difficult. After all, the strict scrutiny standard prohibits a state from 
treating every member of a group alike when a less restrictive means 
could be used to achieve the same objective. If the state's real goal 
is to allow only knowledgeable persons to vote, should it not be re-
103. Of course, resident aliens are heavily concentrated in some areas of the 
country, and the impact of allowing them to vote would therefore be greater in some 
areas than others. But it remains true even in those states with the greatest number 
of resident aliens that extending the vote to all aliens would produce at worst only 
a small marginal increase in the number of uninformed voters. Just under one-
half of all the resident aliens live in three states-California, New York, and Texas, 
INS ANN. REP., supra note 101, at 21-so the total number of voting age aliens in 
these three states should be approximately 1.5 million. The citizens of these three 
states cast a total of almost 18 million votes in the 1976 presidential election. Bu-
REAU OF TIIE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1976, at 455, 
On the continued assumption that 20% of all resident aliens have the knowledge re-
quired to vote intelligently while 75% of all citiz.ens can meet that standard, the 
effect of allowing aliens to vote would be to increase the number of uninformed 
votes cast in these three states (assuming that all aliens of voting age would vote) 
from 4.5 million to 5.7 million. The proportion of uninformed votes cast in tliese 
three states would thus increase from 25% to just under 32%. 
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quired to make some effort to screen out those who lack the neces-
sary qualification and allow the qualified to vote? I have no trouble 
with the suggestion that it would be too expensive or too administra-
tively inconvenient to do the required screening, since in the context 
of strict scrutiny these concerns are traditionally thought insufficient 
to justify the rejection of a less restrictive means in favor of a more 
sweeping rule. The real problem is that the obvious screening de-
vices-literacy tests, American government and history tests, tests 
of comprehension of spoken English-all raise serious difficulties of 
their own. They tend to place in the hands of election examiners 
a measure of discretion that produces a grave risk of discrimination 
on the basis of race, national origin, or political viewpoint. The sus-
pension of all sorts of voter qualification tests in the 1975 Voting 
Rights Act Amendments is a good indication of the federal govern-
ment's concern about this possibility of abuse. 
It may at first seem paradoxical to deny the vote to all aliens 
in order to avoid the need for a system of tests that might result in 
the invidious denial of the vote to some number less than all. But 
two reasons could be offered in support of a state's preference for 
a total ban. First, it is not just the possibility of error that makes 
the testing process so unattractive. The spectacle of having state 
officials determine what is the "correct" view of American history 
or the "correct" view of the role of political parties is troubling in 
itself. Thus, even if the sorting out of aliens could be guaranteed 
error-free, the creation of the elaborate testing system needed to ac-
complish this result could be thought more worrisome than the mis-
takes we now make by excluding from the polls some number of 
aliens who are as well informed as citizens. Second, the decision 
to test aliens for knowledge of public affairs could require the testing 
of citizens as well. The need for testing aliens is much greater, of 
course, since we are assuming that a much higher percentage of 
aliens than citizens is uninformed. But the imposition on aliens 
of a requirement that they prove themselves informed while citizens 
are automatically assumed to be sufficiently informed would raise 
many of the same equal protection problems as the total exclusion 
of aliens.104 And the appalling potential for abuse implicit in a deci-
sion to provide knowledge tests for 80 million citizen voters could 
well be enough to destroy the argument that case-by-case screening 
of aliens is a less restrictive means of achieving the state's objective 
than banning them altogether. 
104. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (holding unconsti-
tutional a federal statute that granted benefits to all spouses of male members of 
the armed forces but to spouses of female members only on proof of dependency). 
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It may be possible, however, to find some device for sorting out 
aliens according to knowledge that would reduce somewhat the num-
ber of mistakes without at the same time creating the potential for 
abuse of a knowledge or literacy test. One possible candidate is a 
durational residence requirement for aliens that would be long 
enough to insure some experience with life in the United States, 
though still substantially shorter than the five years required for nat-
uralization. The point is not to draw a new line only marginally dif-
ferent from the one that now exists. The citizenship qualification 
is more than just a durational residence requirement. Many aliens 
who have lived in the United States for years are nevertheless unable 
to vote because they have not taken advantage of the opportunity 
for naturalization. If lack of knowledge is what disqualifies the alien 
from voting and if it is long-term residence in the United States that 
gives the alien the necessary knowledge, why is it that we refuse 
to extend the vote to all immigrants who have lived here for at least 
five years, whether or not they have gone ahead and been natural-
ized? 
To explain our refusal to take that step in terms of the supposed 
concern about the knowledgeability of aliens, one has to believe that 
naturalization itself has value as a measure of the immigrant's under-
standing of American political issues. I am not persuaded that 
naturalization has any such value. True, aliens who seek naturaliza-
tion are expected to study the American political system, and they 
are tested on their understanding of it. But the test demands 
nothing more than a rudimentary level of understanding-a level 
that has undoubtedly been achieved by a great many unnaturalized 
aliens who have lived in this country for five years or more.100 
These aliens remain unnaturalized not because they are unwilling 
to learn about American government or unable to pass the test, but 
rather, it would appear, because they are reluctant to take the re-
quired oath of renunciation106 and give up the citizenship they 
presently hold. Their reluctance to take the oath may speak badly 
105. The knowledge test requires the petitioner for naturalization to answer five 
or six questions such as, "What document declared the 13 colonies to be free and 
independent States?"; "On what day do we celebrate our Nation's birthday?"; "Who 
is the President now?"; "Who discovered America?". The questions are reported 
in J. WASSERMAN, IMMIGRATION LAw AND PRACTICE 487-88 (2d ed. 1973). In fiscal 
year 1975, 141,537 petitions for naturalization were granted and 2,300 were denied. 
The number denied for lack of understanding of American history and principles 
of government was 14. INS ANN. REP., supra note 101, at 130, 134. 
106. 8 u.s.c. § 1448 (1970). 
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for their loyalty to the United States, and in that sense it may be 
a sufficient reason to deny them the vote. But putting the loyalty 
question aside for a moment, the fact remains that one cannot com-
pletely explain the ban on alien voting in terms of the need for 
knowledge of American political issues. To the extent that a lack 
of knowledge is the state's real concern, a simple durational resi-
dency requirement would do a more precise job of sorting aliens than 
the naturalization requirement, and it would still avoid the potential 
abuse of testing for English literacy, knowledge of local affairs, and 
the like. 
4. Disloyalty 
The claim that' aliens lack the loyalty required to vote respon-
sibly, like the claim that they lack the knowledge to vote intelligently, 
is not inherently implausible. But it is important to make clear ex-
actly what is meant by disloyalty. The state may fear that some 
aliens would use the opportunity to vote as a means of accomplishing 
goals that are disloyal in the broadest sense-disruption, subversion, 
and ultimately destruction of the state. I have no doubt that the 
interest in preventing that kind of disloyalty is compelling under any 
standard. But that interest cannot explain the denial of the vote 
to aliens, since there is no reason to believe that aliens would engage 
in such acts, or, at any rate, would engage in such acts any more fre-
quently than citizens. The conclusion that there is inadequate nexus 
between the alleged end and the means chosen seems to me so ob-
vious that I very much doubt the means could be upheld on this 
theory even under a rational basis test. 
Aliens who seek admission to the United States are subject to 
very careful screening, and they cannot gain admission if a consular 
officer or the Attorney General "knows or has reasonable ground to 
believe [that they] probably would, after entry ... engage in ac-
tivities that would be prohibited by the law of the United States 
relating to espionage, sabotage, public disorder, or in other activity 
subversive to the national security .... "107 Specifically declared 
ineligible for admission are aliens who are, or at any time have been, 
anarchists, communists, or persons who advocate or teach the over-
throw by force of the government of the United States.108 An alien 
who has managed to gain entry into the United States is subject, to 
107. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(29) (1970). 
108. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28) (1970). 
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the same extent as any citizen, to the laws relating to espionage, 
sabotage, public disorder, and the rest. And the resident alien can 
even be prosecuted for treason-the crime against allegiance-since 
he owes at least a temporary allegiance while present in the United 
States and is no freer than a citizen to give aid and comfort to the 
country's enemies.109 Moreover, a resident alien who is an anar-
chist, a communist, an advocate of sabotage or destruction of private 
property, or any one of a great many other things, can be removed 
from the country altogether by deportation. 110 
It is not entirely clear, of course, that the deportation and exclu-
sion rules will accomplish their objective and keep the United States 
free from aliens committed to subversion, sabotage, and disruption. 
And the spies, saboteurs, and assorted ne'er-do-wells who might 
manage to slip into the country in spite of the best efforts of con-
sular and immigration personnel could probably do more mischief 
if allowed to vote than they are now able to accomplish without the 
right to vote. But given the nature of an election, it could not 
be very much more. And what about the citizens who advocate or 
teach subversion, who are anarchists, or who are committed to the 
destruction of private property? They are not subject to any screen-
ing at all, and yet they are all allowed to vote. Most citizens were, 
of course, born in this country and educated here (naturalized 
citizens and persons born to American parents overseas being the 
principal exceptions), but birth and education cannot guarantee that 
a person will never believe in anarchy, violence, or revolution. 
Given the screening and threat of deportation to which aliens are 
subject and citizens are not, a state cannot rationally conclude that 
aliens as a class are more likely than citizens to use the ballot to sub-
vert national security. 
Putting aside the question of disloyalty in the sense of subversion, 
there remains a very troublesome problem in connection with the 
loyalty of aliens. In its subtlest form the claim that aliens lack the 
loyalty to vote responsibly is intertwined with the claim that aliens 
109. The crime of treason, as defined at 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (1970), is applicable 
not only to citizens, but to anyone "owing allegiance to the United States" who 
commits any of the proscribed acts. On the vulnerability of aliens to prosecution 
for treason, at least for treasonous acts committed in the United States, see Powers, 
Treason by Domiciled Aliens, 11 MIL. L. REv. 123 (1962); 17 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 283 (1949). See also F. Franklin, supra note 28, at 2 (Continental Congress 
resolved that transients owed allegiance and could be prosecuted for treason); cf. 
Eisler v. United States, 170 F.2d 273, 279 (D.C. Cir. 1948), appeal dismissed, 338 
U.S. 883 (1949). 
110. 8 u.s.c. § 1251 (1970). 
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lack the knowledge to vote intelligently. •Immigrants who have ar-
rived recently in the United States may know little about this coun-
try's institutions of government or about the issues on which election 
campaigns are fought. They can certainly learn about these matters, 
and it would not take very long for many of them to gain this 
knowledge. But in all likelihood many immigrants are also largely 
ignorant of this country's values and traditions and therefore cannot 
have developed an appreciation of or commitment to them. The 
naturalization requirement for voting could be seen as responsive to 
this concern in two different ways. First, the durational residence 
feature gives the immigrant an opportunity to develop a feel for 
American values and traditions. Second, the act of naturalization 
itself represents a formal and solemn commitment to the country, 
its values, and its institutions. The testing of a prospective citizen's 
loyalty, knowledge, and character is critical, under this view, not so 
much because it screens out the undeserving candidate but rather 
because it makes the attainment of naturalization difficult and mean-
ingful. The judicial setting and the oath of renunciation and alle-
giance ( with its grand language about foreign princes and potentates 
and bearing true faith and allegiance to the United States)111 drive 
home to the new citizen the significance of the occasion.112 It all 
adds up to a very deliberate and ritualized act of opting into the com-
munity and accepting its values and traditions as one's own. 
In my view, this argument is the most substantial one that can 
be made in defense of the citizenship qualification for voting. And 
yet it is by no means free of difficulty. If everything is going to turn 
on a sense of commitment to the country's values and traditions, it 
would seem important to know exactly what values and traditions, 
or "societal and political mores,"113 we have in mind. There has 
been a recurring tendency in this country, as Sacco, Vanzetti, and 
111. 8 C.F.R. § 337.1 (1977): 
"I hereby declare, on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure 
all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, 
of whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen; that I will sup-
port and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States of America 
against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and alle-
giance to the same; that I will bear arms on behalf of the United States when 
required by the law; that I will perform noncombatant service in the armed 
forces of the United States when required by the law; that I will perform work 
of national importance under civilian direction when required by the law; and 
that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of 
evasion; so help me God." 
112. The Immigration and Naturalization Service reports that it makes an effort 
to schedule naturalization ceremonies at places of special historical significance. 
INS ANN. REP., supra note 101, at 21. 
113. Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134, 138 (D. Md. 1974), affd. mem., 426 
U.S. 913 (1976). 
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a great many others could attest, to blame aliens for the introduction 
of ideas that many citizens have found offensive. From the very 
beginning the terms "alien" and "sedition" have shown a remarkable 
affinity for one another. How does one go about deciding which 
values are truly American and which foreign? Which traditions are 
the ones that the alien must appreciate and understand-the tradi-
tions of those who were once slaves or those who were once masters; 
those who won the Mexican-American War or those who lost it; 
those who came from Ireland or those who despised the Irish and 
would have sent them back? 
The very fact that neither candidate in an election wins all the 
votes is in itself a good indication that the electorate is already 
divided on fundamental value questions. Political analysts typically 
assume that different segments of American society-Catholics, 
Chicanos, blue-collar workers, Polish-Americans-have their own 
values and traditions that influence their voting behavior. To which 
set of values and traditions are the aliens expected to commit them-
selves? Do we exclude them from the polls until they have nar-
rowed the choice to two-the Democratic tradition and the Republi-
can tradition-and then tum them loose to make a free choice be-
tween Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson? Or is it rather 
that the central value and tradition of this country is that there is 
no central value and tradition? 1Perhaps aliens are entitled to hold 
whatever views they want, but they cannot be allowed to vote until 
they have come to understand and cherish the fact that they may 
hold whatever views they want. One has an intuitive sense that an 
alien who has not been socialized in the United States will lack cer-
tain characteristics or attitudes that are fundamentally American. 
But given the diversity of socialization experiences available in the 
United States, this intuition would seem a rather treacherous founda-
tion on which to build an argument of compelling state interest. 
Instead of trying to determine the substantive content of the 
country's values and traditions, one might do better to focus on the 
act of commitment to the United States that naturalization apparently 
involves. In terms of values, culture, and language, resident aliens 
may be indistinguishable from at least some group of American 
citizens. And their loyalty may be beyond question, at least in the 
sense that they think well of the country and wish it no harm. But 
what may be lacking is a willingness on the part of resident aliens 
to identify themselves with the country and its people and to give 
up once and for all their attachment to the countries in which they 
were born. The unnaturalized alien is perhaps holding something 
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back, refusing to join in. Yet, although all that may be true, the 
burden on the state is not to show that aliens are somehow different 
from citizens, but rather to show a relationship between the differ-
ence and the state's legitimate interest in regulating the franchise. 
So long as aliens are not disloyal in the larger sense of being sub-
versive or disruptive, what harm could result from allowing them to 
cast a ballot even though they may not have made a wholehearted 
commitment to the United States? What exactly is it that the state 
fears? Perhaps at bottom the argument is essentially symbolic. 
Aliens cannot share in the administration of the social compact until 
they have formally consented to be bound by its terms. Law, in this 
view, "has its origins in a contract, an imagined legal transaction," 
and the concept of citizenship is what "defin[es] the parties to the 
original contract and the membership of the society."114 This con-
tractual view of the nature of the state has a long tradition, and it 
was influential at the time of the founding of this country. But can 
it really be possible to construct a compelling state interest out of 
a metaphor concerning the origins of civil society? It was this same 
metaphor, as Professor Bickel has pointed out,115 that furnished the 
reasoning behind the Supreme Court's decision in the Dred Scott 
case.116 Surely we have reached the point where, if a state is to 
withhold fundamental political rights by classifying persons along 
lines that are inherently suspect, it must be able to point to some 
concrete harm that its measure will prevent. In this context it is hard 
to see what the harm could be. 
Besides, it is simply not correct to say that unnaturalized aliens 
have made no commitment to the United States. In contrast to 
native-born citizens, whose commitment, if any, is tacit, resident 
aliens have committed themselves knowingly and voluntarily. They 
have all had to make considerable effort to qualify for an immigrant 
visa, which is ordinarily a good deal harder to obtain than a certifi-
cate of naturalization. Even after proving themselves qualified, they 
have had to wait months and even more often years for a visa to 
become available. And they have given up their homes in the coun-
tries of their birth and resettled in the United States.117 Moreover, 
114. A. BICKEL, supra note 67, at 5. 
115. Id. 
116. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19- How.) 393 (1857). 
117. Speaking at the Constitutional Convention on the question of a durational 
citizenship requirement for senators, Benjamin Franklin declared: "When foreigners 
after looking about for some other country in which they can obtain more happiness, 
give a preference to ours, it is a proof of attachment which ought to excite our 
confidence & affection." Quoted in 4 J. MADISON, WRITINGS 148 (Hunt ed. 1903). 
1130 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 75:1092 
most resident aliens had ties to the United States even before they 
arrived, for they have tended to follow their countrymen and kins-
men in chains of migration. Nearly forty per cent of those admitted 
each year are close relatives of American citizens, 118 and the propor-
tion of close relatives will increase now that Congress has finally car-
ried over to the Western Hemisphere the system of immigration 
preferences that has been applied to the Eastern Hemisphere for the 
past ten years.119 Furthermore, their children born in the United 
States are citizens of this country at birth. Resident aliens are com-
mitted enough to the United States to serve in the armed forces, and 
they have been drafted into the army in the same way as citizens. 
A resident alien is admitted in the expectation that he will make the 
United States his home and remain here indefinitely. Nothing in 
state or federal law prevents him from developing a strong sentimen-
tal attachment to the United States and its people or from making 
a good faith commitment of his future to this country and to the state 
in which he lives. And the very act of voting in an American elec-
tion would itself represent a form of commitment on the part of the 
alien to the United States.12° Finally, if the state insists that the 
alien voter make an overt and solemn commitment to the United 
118. Of the 386,194 permanent residents admitted in fiscal year 1975, 91,504 
gained admission as immediate relatives of United States citizens. INS ANN. RBP., 
supra note 101, at 6, 36. Immediate relatives are defined as "the children, spouses, 
and parents of a citizen of the United States: Provided, That in the case of parents, 
such citizen must be at least twenty-one years of age." 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1970). 
Aliens who can qualify as immediate relatives are not subject to any numerical limita-
tion. Of the aliens subject to numerical limitation, 160,460 entered under the sys-
tem of preferences applicable to the Eastern Hemisphere. Of these, 52,868 were the 
beneficiaries of preferences for adult children, spouses, brothers, and sisters of citi-
zens (and another 43,077 entered under preferences for the spouses, sons, and daugh-
ters of resident aliens). INS ANN. REP., supra note 101, at 43. The system of pref-
ences gives relatives priority for 74% of the available visas. 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (1970). 
119. Until passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1976, 
Pub. L. No. 94-571, 90 Stat. 2703 (1976), no system of preferences applied in the 
Western Hemisphere, and visas were made available according to the order in which 
applications were filed. Under the system of preferences, relatives of citizens and 
resident aliens will now have priority for 74% of the visas allocated to the Western 
Hemisphere. 
120. The point is implicitly recognized in the federal statute providing for the 
expatriation of American citizens who vote in political elections in other countries. 
8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(5) (1970). Some years before the statute was enacted a House 
committee explained its purpose in these terms: "Taking an active part in the politi-
cal affairs of a foreign state by voting in a political election therein is believed 
to involve a political attachment and practical allegiance thereto which is inconsistent 
with continued allegiance to the United States, whether or not the person in question 
has or acquires the nationality of the foreign state." Codification of the Nationality 
Laws of the United States, H.R. Comm. Print, pt. 1, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 67, quoted 
in Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 54 (1958). The federal statute in question was 
held unconstitutional in Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967). 
April-May 1977] Aliens and the Right To Vote 1131 
States, it could require as a precondition to voting the taking of an 
oath of allegiance. It is "clear that one need not be a citizen in 
order to take in good conscience an oath to support the Constitu-
tion."121 
Moreover, why should one assume that the citizen's commitment 
to the United States is in some sense different from or greater than 
the alien's? The citizen's commitment presumably arises from birth 
and schooling in this country and from having parents who identify 
themselves as citizens. But not all citizens were born or raised in 
the United States. A child born overseas to American parents is 
under some circumstances a citizen of the United States at birth.122 
And a child born here may be taken to another country as an in-
fant and raised there. Furthermore, not all native-born citizens are 
raised by citizens, since the children of aliens are citizens at birth 
and remain citizens whether or not their parents are ever natural-
ized.123 Some citizens are dual nationals-they have acquired 
American citizenship by birth in this country and also the citizenship 
of one or both their parents, or they have acquired American citizen-
ship by virtue of birth overseas to an American parent and also the 
citizenship of the country of their birth-and they will owe allegiance 
not just to the United States but to another country as well. In all 
of these cases there may be some reason to doubt the existence of 
the kind of open and unreserved commfrment to the United States 
and its people that citizenship is assumed to involve. Yet all of these 
citizens, unlike resident aliens, are allowed to vote. 
The number of these cases is small, however, and perhaps they 
can be dismissed as representing a de minimis exception to an other-
wise sound general principle. But there is also a much larger group 
of American citizens who, though born and raised here by citizen-
parents, nevertheless feel a very strong sentimental attachment to a 
state other than the one in which they live or to a foreign homeland 
they may never have known. The Texas-born New Yorker, who 
identifies himself as a Texan and who looks forward eagerly to the 
day he can return to Texas, is entitled to vote in New York even 
though he has not committed himself unreservedly to his adopted 
state.124 And considering the pride we now take in our ethnic 
121. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 111 n.43 (1976). See also 
In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 726 n.18 (1973 ). 
122. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(3), (4), (7) (1970). 
123. See Wong Kim Ark v. United States, 169 U.S. 649 (1898). 
124. Cf. Ramey v. Rockefeller, 348 F. Supp. 780 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Newburger 
v. Peterson, 344 F. Supp. 559 (D.N.H. 1972). 
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heterogeneity, no one would suggest that a citizen is less than fully 
American merely because he studies the language, culture, and his-
tory of another country, visits it, dreams of retiring there someday, 
or even uses his political privileges here to urge a tilt toward that 
country in the foreign policy of the United States. We have come 
to accept and even cherish the fact that many citizens will retain what 
Justice Frankfurter called "old cultural loyalty"126 to another coun-
try, and the line between cultural matters and political matters is 
known to be indistinct. The internment during the Second World 
War of persons of Japanese ancestry--citizen and alien alike-is a 
powerful reminder of how far we have been willing to go on the 
supposition that national origin may be much more accurately pre-
dictive of loyalty than is citizenship. In short, it is hard to see what 
it is about resident aliens that makes us insist on excluding them 
from the polls for want of the necessary commitment to the United 
States. 
Yet it may be objected that the net effect of this kind of argu-
ment is to deny the existence of any distinction at all between the 
citizen and the alien. If the alien is indistinguishable from the 
citizen in terms of knowledge of affairs in the United States, loyalty, 
and commitment to the people and institutions of the United States, 
and if for that reason the alien has a constitutional right to vote, then 
it may appear that the concept of citizenship has been robbed of al1 
its meaning. Plainly, nothing that I have said would jeopardize the 
distinction between the citizen and the nonresident alien. But one 
might insist that under the view presented here resident aliens would 
in effect be naturalized as of the moment they take up residence 
in the United States. Much of the difficulty arises, however, from 
125. The phrase was used by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Baumgartner v. United 
States, 322 U.S. 665, 674 (1944), a case that involved a government attempt to 
revoke naturalization. Baumgartner was a Nazi sympathizer of German birth who 
"spoke so persistently about the superiority of German people, the German schools, 
and the engineering work of the Germans, that he aroused antagonism among his 
co-workers and was transferred to a different section" of the plant in which he 
worked. 322 U.S. at 667-68. Baumgartner sent his children to Germany because 
he wanted them to be educated in German schools, and he attended meetings of 
organizations where the German national anthem was sung and the Nazi salute of-
fered. And, when the Germans captured Dunkirk, he announced: "Today I am 
rejoicing." 322 U.S. at 669. Yet, even in the midst of the Second World War, 
the Supreme Court was unwilling to permit his denaturalization. The standard for 
denaturalization is, to be sure, stricter than the standard for naturalization, and 
Baumgartner might have failed to become a citizen in the first place if the record 
had reflected what it later showed. But Justice Frankfurter's opinion for the Court 
makes clear that "[f]orswearing past political allegiance without reservation and full 
assumption of the obligations of American citizenship are not at all inconsistent with 
cultural feelings imbedded in childhood and youth." 322 U.S. at 674. 
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the assumed equation of citizenship and voting. My argument is not 
that resident aliens look like citizens, so therefore they must be 
citizens. It is rather that in pertinent respects resident aliens are 
enough like citizens that it may be unconstitutional to distinguish be-
tween them in allocating the right to vote. 
Citizens have historically enjoyed certain rights and undertaken 
certain obligations that resident aliens did not share. Every time one 
of those rights or obligations is passed on to aliens the gap between 
citizens and aliens narrows. If we are determined to maintain a gap, 
to preserve a sense of "we" and "they," we could disqualify aliens 
from owning land or deny them welfare benefits or make them all 
wear green hats. The imposition of these disabilities on aliens may 
seem intolerable. But why should it be any more tolerable to make 
the burden of preserving the distinction between citizens and aliens 
fall exclusively on the right to vote, the most precious right of all? 
Moreover, extending the franchise to aliens would not, in fact, 
completely close the gap between citizens and aliens, since voting 
is not the only distinction between the two that survives the Supreme 
Court's recent decisions on the rights of aliens. By the terms of the 
Constitution itself aliens are ineligible to hold certain offices in the 
government of the United States. Aliens do not have the same right 
as citizens to gain admission to the United States. Citizens born 
abroad can take up residence in this country whenever they desire. 
Citizens can abandon their residence in the United States without 
fear of losing their right to return. Aliens, on the other hand, gain 
the right to reside in the United States only upon compliance with 
the stringent terms of the immigration laws. And resident aliens 
who abandon their domicile in this country will not necessarily be 
readmitted. When citizens travel outside the United States they 
carry American passports, and they expect and ordinarily receive the 
diplomatic protection of the United States when the need for it arises. 
Aliens, even resident aliens, have no right to call upon the United 
States for that protection and would not receive it in any case. 
Citizens are entitled to have the government represent their interests 
in international tribunals. Aliens have no such right, and under in-
ternational law the government would be barred from representing 
them even if it had any interest in doing so. Citizens are generally 
free from any obligation to register with the government or to in-
form the government regularly of their whereabouts. Aliens are 
subject to rather elaborate reporting requirements. Citizens can be 
held to account in American courts for conduct overseas in some cir-
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cumstances where aliens apparently cannot. 12° Citizens can confer 
an immigration preference on their relatives overseas in a consider-
able number of situations where aliens cannot. 
It is not altogether clear that all of these distinctions between 
citizens and aliens can withstand strict scrutiny. But they all involve 
action of the federal government as opposed to the states, and for 
that reason the applicable standard of review may be less rigorous 
than strict scrutiny.127 In any case, considering the primacy of the 
right to vote one could reasonably argue that it is distinctions like 
these that should bear the burden of differentiating citizens from 
aliens, and not the distinction between voting and not voting. We 
could, in other words, grant the right to vote to resident aliens and 
still leave them readily distinguishable from citizens. Yet that result 
would remain unacceptable to those who believe that allowing aliens 
to vote would eviscerate the concept of citizenship. Their assump-
tion must be that political rights are inherently and properly rights 
of citizenship, whereas civil rights have no necessary connection with 
citizenship and properly belong to "persons." In the earliest part 
of the country's history, however, the assumption was precisely the 
reverse: citizenship "carried with it civil rights but no political privi-
leges."128 Citizenship, and in particular naturalization, was thought 
important because it determined whether or not a new settler would 
be able to own and convey land.129 Even today, as I indicated 
earlier, the Supreme Court insists that citizenship as such confers no 
right to vote. Indeed, it would seem anomalous to equate citizenship 
with voting so long as we separate the power to make persons 
citizens from the power to make persons voters. The former power 
inheres in the national government, the latter in the states. 
Yet I cannot deny the existence of a widespread assumption that 
the right to vote is not only a right of citizenship, but the quintessen-
tial right of citizenship.130 And the conferral of the right to vote 
126. Cf. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932) (citizens abroad subject 
to service of subpoena). 
127. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976); cf. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 
426 U.S. 88 (1976). 
128. Start, Naturalization in the English Colonies in North America, in AMER!• 
CAN HISTORICAL ASSN., ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE YEAR 1893, at 319 (1894); 
cf. F. FRANKLIN; supra note 28, at 38: "Throughout the debate [on the Naturaliza-
tion Act of 1790] the principal rights involved in citizenship were regarded as land-
holding and office-holding. Only occasionally did suffrage as an independent right 
receive notice." 
129. See Start, supra note 128, at 319-20. 
130. One of the principal reasons for seeking naturalization is doubtless the de-
sire to obtain voting privileges. If aliens were allowed to vote, it is quite possible 
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on aliens would undermine that assumption. But where does the 
assumption come from, and why should we insist on preserving it? 
Intuitively, it seems that there must be some explanation for the as-
sumption. After all, the very fact that it is so widespread may be 
an indication that it responds to some important inner need of 
citizens to distinguish themselves from what are perceived to be out-
siders, even where the outsiders are their neighbors. But I do not 
believe that it is possible to articulate an explanation for this assump-
tion without moving the discussion to a level of extremely high ab-
straction and without putting a great deal of weight on symbolic val-
ues. To sustain the disenfranchisement of aliens on the strength of 
that kind of reasoning would be fundamentally inconsistent, it seems 
to me, with our ordinary approach in determining which state inter-
ests are compelling. I am reluctant to conclude that, because I have 
so much difficulty articulating the state's interest, it must be less than 
compelling. But I am confident at least that the validity of laws de-
nying aliens the vote is by no means self-evident. It is surely not 
enough to tip one's hat at the state interest in-having knowledgeable 
and loyal voters and let it go at that. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The denial to aliens of the right to vote leaves them seriously 
disadvantaged. Thanks to the protection offered by the courts, the 
risk to which aliens are exposed is somewhat limited. Indeed, in 
some respects they may be better off with the suspectness label than 
they would be with the right to vote. With political privileges they 
would presumably win in the legislative forum on some issues and 
lose on others. But so long as the Supreme Court protects them 
from the majority, as a group they can never lose. Groups that 
have political privileges-farmers, union members, downtown mer-
chants--often lose on important issues and find themselves disadvan-
taged by state legislation that imposes special burdens upon them. 
If giving up the right to vote would necessitate strict scrutiny of such 
legislation, the groups might do better to sacrifice their political 
privileges and take their chances in court. And yet I doubt that any 
that fewer aliens would seek naturalization. Indeed, one of the purposes of a citizen-
ship qualification for voting may be to maintain an incentive for aliens to become 
citizens. However worthy that purpose may be, it is clearly an impermissible basis 
for state legislation. See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 97 S. Ct. 2120, 2126 (1977). 
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group would voluntarily make that choice. Although the Su-
preme Court may be able to prevent the infliction of disproportionate 
burdens on the members of a group, it cannot provide them with 
disproportionate benefits. Aliens are unable to participate in the 
political process-forming alliances, trading support, and acquiescing 
in certain losses in order to make possible later gains-that permits 
other groups to promote their own interests in the legislative 
forum.131 The denial to resident aliens of that opportunity can only 
be justified on the basis of some compelling state interest. And it 
is far from clear that it can, in fact, be justified under that exacting 
standard. 
131. See generally I. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 131-
45 (1965). 
